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Abstract
The worldwide air traffic infrastructure is in the late stages of transition from legacy
transponder systems to Automatic Dependent Surveillance - Broadcast (ADS-B) based sys-
tems. ADS-B relies on position information from GNSS and requires aircraft to transmit
their identification, state, and position. ADS-B promises the availability of high-fidelity
air traffic information; however, position and identification data are not secured via au-
thentication or encryption. This lack of security for ADS-B allows non-participants to
observe and collect data on both government and private flight activity. This is a proposal
for a lightweight, interoperable ADS-B confidentiality protocol which uses existing format
preserving encryption and an innovative unidirectional key handoff to ensure backward
compatibility. Anonymity and data confidentiality are achieved selectively on a per-session
basis. This research also investigates the effect of false replies unsynchronized in time
(FRUIT) on the packet error ratio (PER) for Mode S transmissions. High PERs result in
range and time limits being imposed on the key handoff mechanism of this proposal. Over-
all, this confidentiality protocol is ready for implementation, however further research is
required to validate a revised key handoff mechanism.
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INTEROPERABLE ADS-B CONFIDENTIALITY
I. Introduction
1.1 Motivation
A rash of mid-air collisions occurred in American skies during the late 1950s and early
1960s. These prompted the development and deployment of widespread air surveillance
infrastructure. This system was called the air traffic control radar beacon system (ATCRBS)
and was the first major development in civil air surveillance. As the volume of air traffic has
increased over time there has been a continued need for modernization of the surveillance
infrastructure [2].
Automatic dependent surveillance-broadcast (ADS-B) is the future of air surveillance
and collision avoidance and is implemented by the Mode S - Extended Squitter (Mode
S-ES) protocol. ADS-B is a means by which aircraft self report position and other data,
allowing precise surveillance for air traffic control (ATC). The Federal Aviation Adminis-
tration (FAA) includes the technology in its “Next Generation Air Transportation System
Figure 1. Deadly Collision, 31 Jan 1957 [1]
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(NextGen)” technology suite, designed to make air transportation safer and more efficient.
The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and at least 19 nations require its
use. The paradox of ADS-B is that it implements modern and future applications with
legacy digital communications technology in an already congested spectrum. Chapter II
will discuss this history and show that a focus on backward compatibility for any additions
to Mode S-ES is important to gain acceptance among regulators and users.
This paradigm leaves the global air transport system with dated technology that is asked
to carry growing amounts of data. Innovative methods are used to include information
such as identification, precise location, and status in broadcast data packets. This data is
transmitted without security considerations. Any entity, malicious or not, with a software
defined radio (SDR) (available for under $20) can trivially receive and decode messages
from any aircraft within line-of-sight [3]. This enables real-time precision tracking of any
aircraft transmitting ADS-B. This data is aggregated and made publicly available by numer-
ous crowdsourcing applications such as FlightRadar24 and FlightAware, increasing cover-
age beyond line-of-sight. Figure 2 shows the coverage of FlightAware’s ADS-B reception
network. State-sponsored intelligence services with advanced capabilities can easily and
quickly gather precise and accurate data on sensitive platforms and operations.
Figure 2. FlightAware Coverage
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Further, the lack of ADS-B integrity provisions allow malicious entities opportunity to
inject false data into the network. This data can cause denial of service, inclusion of nonex-
istent tracks, or modification of legitimate tracks. Figure 3 shows a real-world example of
one real aircraft injecting seven false tracks [4]. With very limited resources, an entity can
do this or launch other cyber attacks detailed in Chapter II.
Figure 3. Spoofed ADS-B Tracks
Most industry stakeholders are concerned, in some respect, with security. Those in-
volved in aviation generally maintain safety as their primary objective. For these entities,
including civil aviation authorities (CAAs) and airlines, they may only be concerned with
security as far as it impacts safety. Their efforts to improve ADS-B security are likely fo-
cused on integrity issues. Others, such as military, government, intelligence, corporate, or
privacy conscious general aviation (GA) operators, will often have a desire for confidential-
ity or privacy while retaining safety as the primary goal. Figures 4, 5, and 6 show instances
of potentially sensitive missions being monitored in real-time via crowdsourcing networks.
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United States (US) national leadership, as well as defense and intelligence organizations,
have a serious concern with the future of insecure and easily aggregated surveillance data
[5]. In the past, adversaries desiring this level of data would spend enormous sums to gain
access to data they can now access for free.
The research herein focuses primarily on the mitigation of vulnerabilities imposed on
ADS-B by its lack of confidentiality provisions.
Figure 4. Air Force One
4
Figure 5. Israeli F-35 - USAF ICAO Address
Figure 6. RQ-4 Over the Black Sea
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1.2 Research
This research involves the fields of cyber security, digital communications, and aviation
with focus on two primary research questions:
1. How can Mode S-ES be extended to allow confidential operations without requiring
a change to existing standards while retaining interoperability with existing systems?
2. What is the open-air Mode S-ES link performance and how does this impact the
real-world implementation of the proposed protocol?
Developing a security protocol is an applied research effort which continues previous work
in security and cryptography and implements systems engineering processes. The result-
ing security protocol makes use of the ability to conduct packet switching over a binary
pulse position modulated (PPM) radio frequency (RF) signal on 1090 MHz. The open-air
characterization of this channel is a use-inspired basic research [6]. It seeks fundamen-
tal understanding while considering use cases, one of which is ADS-B. This research will
increase general knowledge regarding the waveforms of interest in the real world while
serving as a new performance metric for Mode S-ES.
Preparatory work is critical to enable this and follow on research involving ADS-B.
This includes:
• Development and fielding of the Experimental ADS-B Testbed System (EATS)
• Integration of EATS with a carriage aircraft
Open-air test missions required to gather experimental data for stateless packet switching
research were conducted during Project Have Crypto. Have Crypto was a test management
project (TMP) executed at the United States Air Force (USAF) Test Pilot School (TPS).
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1.3 Results
This research was successful in developing a confidentiality protocol for Mode S-ES.
The resulting proposal meets the requirements laid out in Chapter III. Its current form
requires no changes to Mode S-ES specifications.
The effort to characterize stateless packet switching performance was marginally suc-
cessful. Sufficient data was gathered to partially determine link performance, however
constraints imposed by external processes place certain limits on data usability. Details of
these limitations are in Chapter IV.
1.4 Organization
This document is organized to effectively show the development of the security proto-
col along with the enabling packet error ratio (PER) research. Chapter II will discuss a brief
history, information security principles, previous ADS-B security work, and a discussion of
how security principles relate to ADS-B. This discussion is critical to the process presented
in Chapter III. Chapter III is dedicated to the process of decomposing security principles,
determining requirements, and designing a protocol with which to implement privacy and
confidentiality for Mode S-ES. Chapter IV gives methodology, results, and analysis of ex-
perimental link performance determination. Analysis includes a discussion on the viability
of connectionless packet switching over binary PPM physical channels. Chapter V brings
the two lines of effort together and proposes follow on research related to this work.
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II. Background
2.1 Air Surveillance History
Chapter I noted that legacy technology is a significant factor in the lack of security for
ADS-B. The use of legacy technology in modern “next generation” air surveillance systems
is brought about by a continuous need for backward compatibility.
2.1.1 Identification Friend or Foe (IFF).
The Royal Air Force (RAF) developed the military IFF system during World War II. A
ground-based interrogator would broadcast a signal to nearby aircraft. If an aircraft did not
respond properly, it was assumed to be enemy [7]. Eventually, this challenge and response
system allowed the directional replies to be correlated with radar, giving a more accurate
picture of participating aircraft. The original IFF system was extended into the military
system of today, using the various modes detailed in Table 1.
Mil Term Civil Term Type Data
Mode 1 - Interrogate/Reply 2-Digit Octal
Mode 2 - Interrogate/Reply 4-Digit Octal
Mode 3/C Mode A/C Interrogate/Reply 4-Digit + Altitude
Mode 4 - Interrogate/Reply Encrypted Pulse Train
- Mode S Interrogate/Reply See RTCA DO-181 [8]
- Mode S-ES Broadcast See RTCA DO-260 [9]
Mode 5 - Both Encrypted Mode S & ES
Table 1. IFF Modes
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2.1.2 Air Traffic Control Radar Beacon System (ATCRBS).
The ATCRBS is a direct development from the military IFF system of the early 1960s.
Developed largely in response to a string of midair collisions, it uses 1030 MHz for inter-
rogations and 1090 MHz for replies, which remains the current standard. ATCRBS uses
Mode A for identification (via an assignable 4-digit code) and Mode C for pressure altitude
encoding. These modes are compatible with military IFF.
2.1.3 Mode S.
Mode S developed due to frequency overloading and garbling which occurred as air
traffic grew. The major change, which allowed additional growth, was a selective address-
ing scheme: interrogations can be directed to an individual aircraft. A major requirement
for Mode S was backwards compatibility with ATCRBS. The committee which developed
mode S “concluded that incremental upgrade was feasible, and the the benefits of reduced
risk and cost outweighed the increased design difficulty of the new system [2].”
2.1.4 Automatic Dependent Surveillance - Broadcast (ADS-B).
Mode S-ES was the MIT Lincoln Labs submission for use as an ADS-B standard. De-
veloped as an extension of Mode S, it favored backwards compatibility over new tech-
nology. The Mode S-ES packet was increased in length from 56 to 112 bits to allow for
the inclusion of global navigation satellite system (GNSS) based positioning information.
Mode S-ES is the global standard for ADS-B.
The designs of each follow on technology: IFF, ATCRBS, Mode S, and ADS-B priori-
tized interoperability over new technology. This allows excellent safety features to propa-
gate rapidly throughout the air transport industry. In many systems, safety and security are
competing objectives. In aviation, they are more often directly correlated, necessitating a
focus on modern security technology [10]. For more detailed history, see [2].
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2.2 Mode S and ADS-B Basics
ADS-B is an air surveillance technology which both extends and is a subset of sec-
ondary surveillance radar (SSR) Mode S (Figure 7). A short technical background discus-
sion is necessary to fully understand the impetus for, and results of, this research. More
information can be found in the overview provided by the FAA [11] and the technical dis-
cussion by Sun [12].
2.2.1 ADS-B Technologies.
ADS-B as a technology stack is composed of several capabilities that differ in vari-
ous properties of the physical, link, and presentation layers (Figure 7). Universal access
transceiver (UAT) is an alternative implementation of ADS-B used in the US to relieve fre-
quency congestion and allow for faster bit rates. It is used for air surveillance below 18,000
feet and the transmission of weather data to aircraft. Mode S-ES, also known as 1090ES,
is an implementation of the Mode S protocol that implements ADS-B for most aircraft. In
the case of this research, the term ADS-B refers to the Mode S-ES protocol in particular.
UAT is not addressed, though many concepts and implementations are adaptable to it.
Mode S-ES
Mode A Mode C
ATCRBS
Mode S
UAT
ADS-B
Figure 7. ADS-B Technology
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2.2.2 Mode S Surveillance.
Mode S is a follow-on technology to ATCRBS which allows selective addressing of
individual aircraft via a unique 24-bit ICAO address. Most of the various Mode S packet
formats are used in an interrogate-response scheme. The extended squitter format is used
in Mode S-ES, a broadcast scheme.
0 0000 VS: 1 CC: 1 -1- SL: 3 -2- RI: 4 -2- AC: 13 AP: 24DF-0 Short Air-Air Surv (ACAS)
0 0010 -27 or 83- P: 24DF-1 Unused
0 0001 -27 or 83- P: 24DF-2 Unused
0 0011 -27 or 83- P: 24DF-3 Unused
0 0100 FS: 3 DR: 5 UM: 6 AC: 13 AP: 24DF-4 Surv Altitude Reply
0 0101 FS: 3 DR: 5 UM: 6 AC: 13 AP: 24DF-5 Surv Identity Reply
0 0110 -27 or 83- P: 24DF-6 Unused
0 0111 -27 or 83- P: 24DF-7 Unused
0 1000 -27 or 83- P: 24DF-8 Unused
0 1001 -27 or 83- P: 24DF-9 Unused
0 1010 -27 or 83- P: 24DF-10 Unused
0 1011 CA: 3 AA: 24 PI: 24DF-11 All-Call Reply
0 1100 -27 or 83- P: 24DF-12 Unused
0 1101 -27 or 83- P: 24DF-13 Unused
0 1110 -27 or 83- P: 24DF-14 Unused
0 1111 -27 or 83- P: 24DF-15 Unused
1 0000 VS: 1 -2- SL: 3 -2- RI: 4 -2- AC: 13 MV: 56 AP: 24DF-16 Long Air-Air Surv (TCAS)
1 0001 CA: 3 AA: 24 ME: 56 PI: 24DF-17 Extended Squitter
1 0010 CF: 3 AA: 24 ME: 56 PI: 24DF-18 Extended Squitter: Non-Txpdr
1 0011 AF: 3 Military Application: 104DF-19 Military Application
1 0100 FS: 3 DR: 5 UM: 6 AC: 13 MB: 56 AP: 24DF-20 Comm-B Alt Reply
1 0101 FS: 3 DR: 5 UM: 6 ID: 13 MB: 56 AP: 24DF-21 Comm-B Identity Reply
1 0110 -27 or 83- P: 24DF-22 Reserved for Military
1 0111 -27 or 83- P: 24DF-23 Unused
1 1 -1- KE: 1 ND: 4 MD: 80 P: 24DF-24 Comm-D (ELM)
Figure 8. Mode S Reply Formats [8]
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Figure 8 shows the various downlink formats, or DFs, which a Mode S packet may
have. Note that ADS-B currently only uses DF-17 and DF-18. All remaining formats are
used for other Mode S protocols or are unused. Mode S uplink (from the interrogator to
the aircraft) takes place on 1030 MHz, is modulated with differential phase-shift keying
(DPSK), and is not used in ADS-B.
2.3 Information Security & ADS-B
2.3.1 Previous Work.
Several excellent overviews have been published in the past, most notably Strohmeier,
et al. in [13]. The purpose of this section is to build on Strohmeier’s work and use decom-
position of security principles to understand the precious work in ADS-B security.
2.3.2 Security Principles.
Traditional information security discussion will use the CIA Triad to frame security
best practices [14]:
• Confidentiality: information is only accessed by entities with ‘need to know’
• Integrity: information originates from an authenticated source and is not tampered
with, changed, or destroyed en route to the using entity.
• Availability: the service(s) which the information serves or is part of are available to
authorized users when required/desired
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Security
Confidentiality
Integrity
Availability
Figure 9. CIA Triad
In the realm of ADS-B it is helpful to further decompose these terms (Figure 10):
ADS-B Security
Confidentiality
(Privacy)
Integrity
Source
Authentication
Authentication Content
Immutability
Non-repudiation
Data
Verification
Availability
Figure 10. ADS-B Security Decomposition
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2.3.2.1 Confidentiality.
ADS-B confidentiality, treated here as synonymous with privacy, means that data is
only accessible to intended entities. The direct users of a given aircraft’s ADS-B data are
ATC and nearby aircraft. ATC requires knowledge of ADS-B data to accomplish their
mission: safe separation of aircraft while enhancing system efficiency.
There are many cases in which the user of an airborne platform wishes or is required
to participate and contribute to the safe conduct of air transport, yet desires some level of
privacy for their movement or operation. This user requires the ADS-B data associated
with them remain confidential, only revealed to those with need to know.
It is important to note that the implementation of confidentiality does not imply any sort
of authentication or verification. Depending on system design, one could have a confiden-
tial system in which an adversary could manipulate, remove, or insert false data.
2.3.2.2 Source Authentication.
The integrity of ADS-B data can be uniquely decomposed into source authentication
and data verification, each with associated challenges.
Source authentication is the practice of ensuring that received data did originate from,
and can be attributed to, a certain entity without modification by an outside entity. This
reflects the authentication, content immutability, and non-repudiation principles.
Source authentication does not give assurance that the reporting entity is where it says
it is and is doing what it says it is doing. An authenticated aircraft could be inadvertently
or maliciously sending false data as a trusted entity.
2.3.2.3 Data Verification.
Data verification is is a concept added under the umbrella of integrity when using un-
trusted broadcast communications. Data verification ensures that the information transmit-
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ted is accurate. For example, data verification is used to ensure that the location reported by
an ADS-B target is the true location of that aircraft or vehicle. A data verification scheme
should also be able to verify other parameters such as track/heading, vertical speed, intent,
etc. Data verification does not, in this case, determine whether a message has been tam-
pered with, it only seeks to determine if the data is true. Data verification is independent
of source authentication; an unauthenticated source’s data can be verified and verified data
does not necessarily imply entity authentication, message immutability, or attribution.
2.3.2.4 Availability.
Availability refers to assurance of service to users when and where it is required in
accordance with design specifications. Generally, ADS-B should be available at all times
to all users within its service volume unless a known or scheduled outage is communicated
to users. Only reductions in availability due to malicious activity are addressed here.
2.3.3 Attack Classification.
After describing the basic decomposition of security with regard to ADS-B, it is then
useful to classify various attack types according to the security area they exploit. Figure 11
shows a simplified breakdown of various specific attack categories into overarching classes
that generally correlate to the security principles discussed above. Further classification of
some of these attacks based on severity and complexity can be found in [13]. This section
focuses on attacks against the datalink segment of ADS-B. Network attacks against the
ground infrastructure are beyond the scope of this section.
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Targeted
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Figure 11. ADS-B Attack Classification
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• Eavesdropping exploits the lack of a confidentiality scheme in ADS-B.
– Preparatory reconnaissance sets the groundwork for a follow on attack [15].
– Targeted collection seeks data about a certain platform, person, or organization.
– Mass collection is used to determine pattern of operations or other information
and is not necessarily nefarious.
• Data Manipulation exploits the lack of source authentication or data verification.
– False Target Injection, also known as ghost aircraft injection, is the insertion
of messages that cause a non-existent platform to appear within the ADS-B
system. This target does not need to represent a certain aircraft and can be used
to cause alternative behavior in controllers and platforms [3, 15, 16].
– Spoofing, or impersonation, is the false target injection of a specific, existing,
platform. Spoofing allows an attacker to show a certain platform taking a cer-
tain action. This can be used to create alternative behavior just like false target
injection, but can potentially have more predictable and narrow effects. Alter-
natively, this attack can be used against the entity that controls the platform
being spoofed [3].
– Target Removal is a difficult attack that consists of the removal of a valid target
from the displays of controllers and aircrew. While categorized as data manip-
ulation due to its targeting of a specific platform, this attack requires precise
positioning and has more in common with denial of service (DoS) attacks [17].
– Target Data Modification is a combination of target removal and spoofing. By
removing correct data and replacing it with spoofed data, an attacker can make
it appear that an existing platform is taking an action which it is not [17].
– Valid Target with False Data is an attack that can be accidental or purpose-
ful. This is when a platform that exists and is the true transmitter of messages
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places false content in those messages. Whether due to positioning inaccura-
cies, aircrew input errors, or a more nefarious purposes, this attack can lead to
dangerous behavior modifications of controllers and other platforms.
– A Replay attack can be used to simplify the other types of attacks listed here
but the attacker loses granular control over most variables [3]. A replay attack
can also be a form of DoS.
• Denial of Service attacks attempt to disrupt the availability of ADS-B. This disrup-
tion may target a specific geographic location, time period, or platform. Its intent
may be to cause confusion or alternative behavior among controllers. DoS may be
used to enable or enhance other types of attack.
– Noise/Tone Jamming attempts to either overload the front end of receivers or
raise the noise floor to the point that actual messages cannot be decoded [18].
The RF power required for this attack makes it either very difficult or very
localized [15].
– Garbling is a form of jamming that makes use of the interference naturally
present when several ADS-B and/or SSR transmissions overlap. The use of this
interference to actively deny ADS-B reception to an entity or area constitutes
an attack [18].
– Preamble Flooding is very similar to a garbling attack, however instead of caus-
ing interference that corrupts messages, it utilizes a string of Mode S preambles
to overload the computational capability of the receiver’s signal processor [18].
– Message Flooding is like preamble flooding but uses a train of full messages to
target the application layer of the ATC system rather than the signal processor.
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– Multiple False Target insertion is not intended to cause hardware or software
failure, but to overload the human operator, namely a controller. Similar to false
target injection, this attack is intended to cause cognitive overload to change
behavior [15, 18].
It must be noted that while these attacks have been broadly classified according to the
security principle they exploit, many of them cross the boundaries between attack classes.
This should be taken into account when choosing or designing countermeasures.
2.4 Security Solutions
It is useful to discuss security solutions within the construct of security principles and
attack classification. Some solutions mitigate attacks across classes while others have nar-
rower focus.
2.4.1 Confidentiality Solutions.
Communications confidentiality can be ensured via properly implemented encryption
that is open and reviewed [19]. The majority of ADS-B security solutions that address
confidentiality utilize either symmetric or asymmetric cryptography.
Finke et al. analyzed the use of format preserving encryption (FPE) while acknowledg-
ing the difficulty of symmetric key distribution on an untrusted network [20]. Follow on
work regarding the military applicability of symmetrically encrypted ADS-B was done in
[21, 22]. Yang et al. utilize FPE in conjunction with timed efficient stream loss-tolerant au-
thentication (TESLA) [7]. Baek, Hableel, et al. propose a staged identity based encryption
(SIBE) construct [23] based on the work of Boneh and Franklin [24]. Several have explored
various implementations of public key infrastructure (PKI) for use in ADS-B [13].
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2.4.2 Integrity Solutions.
Strohmeier et al. explore source authentication and data verification solutions in depth
[13]. They specifically divide their work into an exploration of “secure broadcast authen-
tication”, equivalent to source authentication, and “secure location verification”, a subset
of data verification. In the case of data verification, most efforts specifically seek location
Integrity Solutions
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Public Key
Crypto
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Key Pub
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Group
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Data
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Traffic
Modeling
Figure 12. Taxonomy of ADS-B Integrity Solutions [13]
verification and we will treat these terms as synonymous. Note that there exists other data
(callsign, intent, status) transmitted by ADS-B that ought to be verified as well. A thorough
discussion of these techniques can be found in [13] and the references therein.
2.4.3 Availability Solutions.
Solutions to the problem of ensuring availability increase in difficulty with the sophis-
tication of the attack. A discussion of anti-jam techniques is beyond the scope of this
section.
2.4.4 Security Solution Distribution.
Figure 13 shows the distribution of current research into ADS-B security. It reveals that
relatively few have done work in confidentiality; all of the proposals shown here require
key distribution or significant changes to the current Mode S-ES specifications. The result
of Chapter III is different from previous solutions because it avoids both secure key
distribution and changes to currently implemented specifications.
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III. Confidentiality Protocol
3.1 Overview
Chapter II shows a significant security gap in the current iteration of ADS-B. The lack
of confidentiality in particular drives the research question:
How can Mode S-ES be extended to allow confidential operations without requiring
a change to existing standards while retaining interoperability with existing systems?
Answering this question requires an applied research process. This chapter will use a for-
mal systems engineering model to answer the research question. The intent of this process
is to be efficient, thorough, and precise, not necessarily to be verbose. To that end, a
lightweight adaptation of a defense research and development systems engineering pro-
cess [90] will form the structure through which the question can be addressed and results
demonstrated.
3.2 Process
While the process here is driven by a research question, it is still useful to define various
stakeholders. Various stakeholders in ADS-B are discussed below. Many of these are
directly tied to the motivation addressed in Chapter I.
Following the discussion of stakeholders is one of scope. Scoping is important for
research in general and applied research in particular.
Process inputs include research questions and objectives, scope, and stakeholders. Re-
quirements and constraints are derived from these inputs.
Requirements analysis uses process inputs to derive various categories of requirements.
These are divided into:
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Functional Requirements: the necessary tasks, actions, or activities that must be ac-
complished.
Performance Requirements: The extent to which a mission or function must be exe-
cuted; generally measured in terms of quantity, quality, coverage, timeliness, or readiness.
These will often quantify the qualities expressed in functional requirements.
Design Requirements: The ‘build to’ and ‘code to’ requirements expressed in technical
data packages and technical manuals. This research does not go so far as to derive design
requirements for newly innovated subsystems but will mention those currently in place.
Constraints: constraints are specific limitations placed upon a design by process inputs
and should be considered simultaneously with requirements.
Process
Inputs
Requirements
Analysis
Functional
Allocation
Design
Synthesis
Process
Outputs
Figure 14. System Development Process
Functional analysis and allocation is the process by which requirements are trans-
formed into a coherent description of functions which are synthesized into a final design.
Based on the scope of this research, the functional allocation process is fairly lightweight,
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essentially bridging the gap between requirements analysis and design synthesis.
Design synthesis is the process by which as design is developed based on the products
of functional analysis and allocation. Outputs from design synthesis are expressed via DoD
Architecture Framework (DoDAF) Operational Viewpoints, psuedocode, and other visual
system depictions.
3.3 Stakeholders
The stakeholders for ADS-B are numerous and multiply greatly when considering na-
tional boundaries. When considered here, entities that belong to a specific state are generi-
cized to maintain global relevance. A key consideration is each entities’ policy and techni-
cal relationship with ADS-B and information security.
3.3.1 Users.
Users include entities for which ADS-B is intended to increase operational safety and
efficiency. They provide data to, while receiving services from, the system. These enti-
ties vary widely in size and mission but share the fundamental requirement for physical
separation from other users while operating on the ground and in the air.
3.3.1.1 Air Carriers.
Air carriers include corporations who provide scheduled transportation services for the
public. Also referred to as airlines, air carriers have a public flight schedule and publish
real time status data for the majority of their flights. Given the inherently public nature of
their operations and their ability to internally protect their passengers’ privacy, they do not
have a significant need for privacy or confidentiality when it comes to surveillance data.
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3.3.1.2 Charter Operators.
Charter operators execute on-demand flights for a paying customer or cargo agent.
These operators do not necessarily have scheduled service, though they may execute the
same route at similar times repetitively. Charter operators’ requirement for privacy most
often rests with their customer. If their customer desires confidentiality, the operator may
in turn require confidentiality of associated surveillance data.
3.3.1.3 Corporate Flight Departments.
Corporate flight departments, as defined here, includes indigenous flight operations
within a business or corporation as well as charter operators who exclusively or majoritively
operate on the behalf of the same. Corporate operators have a significant requirement for
privacy with surveillance data; often their ability to innovate and compete depends upon
the confidentiality of their movements and actions [91].
3.3.1.4 Private Operators.
Private operators are individuals or families who own or rent aircraft for transportation
or leisure. The operations conducted are diverse, ranging from regional transportation to
aerobatics, soaring, training, etc. While many private operators do not have a requirement
for privacy, they may desire privacy for many reasons. As the ongoing global debate over
privacy rights continues, it is important that technical solutions be in place to support any
policy outcomes.
3.3.1.5 Military & Defense.
An obvious use case for confidential communications, military and defense related op-
erations have significant requirements for confidentiality. Operations security seeks to deny
adversaries information regarding current operations, pattern of operations, plans, tactics,
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and movements. While military command and control has access to robust, symmetrically
encrypted surveillance, the ability for aircraft to securely participate in civil surveillance
schemes is almost non-existent.
3.3.1.6 Intelligence & Diplomatic Agencies.
Like military operations, intelligence and diplomatic operations have serious require-
ments for confidentiality. Unlike the military, there likely does not exist a persistent com-
mand and control network that can share data with civil air traffic control. Current practices
might include the faking of data or quite literally “flying under the radar,” but a technical
confidentiality solution could increase safety while meeting mission requirements.
3.3.2 Service Providers.
Service providers are the entities which receive data from users and provide services
to users. Generally, these services primarily provide separation of traffic while increasing
airspace efficiency. They may also provide data up-links, currently in the form of traffic
and weather.
3.3.2.1 Air Traffic Control (ATC).
ATC is an organization tasked by a government to provide separation of air traffic in-
side a nation’s airspace. This is conducted in accordance with regulations and standard
procedures for that nation, many of which may be standardized with ICAO and other na-
tions. ATC currently consists of a surveillance network, voice and data communications,
and controllers. Controllers use surveillance data to monitor airspace and communication
systems to instruct airborne aircraft to modify their course of action as required. ATC’s
concern with the implementation of a security protocol is likely limited to the cost and
training required to operate.
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3.3.2.2 Surveillance Network Operator.
ATC is an organization tasked to design, build, deploy, and maintain the hardware and
software associated with the ground segment of a network. Hardware may include radars,
ADS-B transceivers, remote communications outlets, dedicated communications networks,
and controller workstations. Software includes everything required for the hardware to in-
terface with controllers, users, and supervisors. The network operator will bear the burden
of implementing updates to hardware and software if a security protocol is implemented.
3.3.2.3 Equipment Manufacturers.
Equipment manufacturers build the hardware and software for both the ground seg-
ment and airborne transponders. They must implement the technical standards imposed
by regulatory bodies and validate compliance via testing. This process for safety-critical
equipment is generally rigorous and expensive. Equipment manufacturers would probably
receive beneficial contracts for additional hardware and software if a security protocol is
developed.
3.3.3 Regulatory Bodies.
Regulatory bodies can be governmental or non-governmental and regional or global in
influence. They primarily make laws, regulations, and technical standards to ensure safety,
or charging third-parties with the same.
3.3.3.1 Civil Aviation Authority (CAA).
Likely the main aviation regulating body of a given state, the CAA is chartered to
ensure aviation safety. Depending on the nation, the focus on safety is often separated from
security by functional separation of security to another governmental body [10]. CAAs
will regulate operations, certify operators, do quality assurance on maintenance, provide
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or charter ATC organizations, provide aeronautical data, and the like. For most proposed
authentication schemes, the cost and impact to safety outweigh the benefits which can be
partially accomplished via current verification methods. Likewise, because most CAAs do
not have a legal requirement to protect privacy or confidentiality, any solution in that realm
must be cost-effective and interoperable to have a chance at political success.
3.3.3.2 Lawmaking Body.
Lawmakers’ status is dependent upon the constitution of the state in question. These
may be executives, ministers, legislatures, judiciaries, etc. Generally these lawmaking
bodies will give broad directives to a CAA to allow further regulatory action. These will be
the entities that drive the policy of privacy for given nation. Often they also are the approval
authority for any funding to required to make system updates.
3.3.3.3 International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO).
ICAO is an United Nations agency which exists to foster global consensus on policies
to support a “safe, efficient, secure, economically sustainable and environmentally respon-
sible civil aviation sector [92].” Their Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs) are
partially or fully adopted by most national CAAs to enhance interoperability.
3.3.3.4 Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics (RTCA) &
European Organisation for Civil Aviation Equipment (EUROCAE).
RTCA and EUROCAE are non-governmental standards bodies which create, modify,
and ratify technical standards for avionics and associated electronic equipment. Most
CAAs have regulations that require compliance with these technical standards. RTCA
DO-260 is the document which provides the standards for Mode S-ES.
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3.4 Scope
Scoping is critical in research. In this research, there are two layers of scoping. The first
is the scope of the research questions and objectives. This is a scoping that takes place as
part of the development process and is the result of the research question, previous work,
and stakeholders. As discussed thoroughly in Chapter II, the decomposition of security
principles and analysis of previous work combine with stakeholder desires to scope the
research question and objectives. This scoping results in a research question and require-
ments which focus on privacy and confidentiality, allowing for, but not directly addressing
authentication or verification security solutions.
The second layer of scoping in this research is external to, and designed to limit, the
process itself. This protocol development process is modeled after DoD systems engineer-
ing processes. Not all of the process details are useful for this research: most management
and policy factors are not addressed. This allows a narrow focus on technical solutions to
the ADS-B confidentiality problem.
3.5 Process Inputs
The inputs to the development process include:
• Research Question: How can Mode S-ES be extended to allow confidential opera-
tions without requiring a change to existing standards while retaining interoperability
with existing systems?
• Previous Work: Security can be decomposed into confidentiality and integrity, each
with a separate technical solution.
• Stakeholder Priorities: Various stakeholders have competing priorities, but the “cus-
tomer” stakeholders prioritize confidentiality and interoperability.
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3.6 Requirements Analysis
Requirements must be achievable, verifiable, unambiguous, and consistent. They ought
also to be abstracted to the appropriate level of system hierarchy. This analysis retains a
sufficiently high level of abstraction to remain succinct while giving enough detail that a
technical solution to the research question is attainable. Requirements pertaining to base-
line ADS-B are referenced, but not restated. The following requirements are derived from
the process inputs:
3.6.0.1 Functional Requirements.
FR-1: The confidential ADS-B system must render a participating node’s identification
anonymous to third parties while remaining unambiguous to authorized receivers.
FR-2: The system must selectively obfuscate data fields within the ‘ME field’ (payload) of
a DF-17 ADS-B message, rendering them unreadable to third parties yet readable to
authorized receivers.
FR-3: The system must be able to switch between unencrypted and encrypted modes man-
ually and based on performance criteria.
FR-4: When not in an encryption mode, the system must behave in accordance with RTCA
DO-181E and DO-260B, i.e. currently ratified standards for Mode S and Mode S-ES,
respectively.
3.6.0.2 Performance Requirements.
PR-1: The confidential ADS-B system must have ≤ 0.1 probability of identification col-
lisions between two separate airborne aircraft and the event of a collision must be
mitigated. Assume 20,000 aircraft airborne at any given time.
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PR-2: The confidential ADS-B system implementation must be capable of deployment in
transponders fielded post 2010 and maintain a transmit rate of at least 6.2 messages
per second in accordance with DO-260.
PR-3: If encryption is used to obfuscate transmitted information, it must resist a brute-force
attack using current, commercially available compute capability for 25 years.
PR-4: Two obfuscation modes must be available: one which anonymizes the ICAO address
and obfuscates the callsign, and a second which also obfuscates position.
PR-5: While set in a ‘resolution advisory (RA) mode, the system must cease obfuscating
location and altitude information when within 3 nautical mile (NM) horizontally and
2000 feet vertically of traffic sensed from on-board sources. This behavior is not
required for off-board sources (e.g. TIS-B). The system will continue to obfuscate
identification.
3.6.0.3 Design Requirements.
DR-1: The confidential ADS-B system must adhere to the design requirements and imple-
mentation specified in RTCA DO-181E and DO-260B in every respect other than the
modules added to enable the above functions.
DR-2: Regardless of added modules, all RF characteristics of the system must adhere to
RTCA DO-181E and DO-260B.
DR-3: Any hardware or software cryptographic modules must be designed and coded in
accordance with National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Federal In-
formation Processing Standards (FIPS) for secure development and deployment.
DR-4: Secure key distribution is not feasible to the general public and will not be part of
any encryption scheme used.
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3.6.0.4 Constraints.
CR-1: Interoperability and Backwards Compatibility:
• The system will allow unmodified transponders and traffic collision avoidance
systems (TCASs) which are currently approved for use to continue operating
without further updates.
• The system must not require a modification to the processing and display of
non-participating tracks to the ground segment.
• While it is allowable for provisions to be added to technical standards, the cur-
rent provisions must not be deleted or modified.
CR-2: Return Data Channel and Broadcast Architecture
• The constraints in CR-1 imply that the system, being a broadcast protocol, will
not have access to a return communications channel, since one does not and
cannot exist within Mode S-ES without significant modification to current stan-
dards.
• Because ADS-B is a broadcast protocol and many Mode S-ES transponders do
not possess Mode S enhanced surveillance (EHS) or extended length message
(ELM) capability, the security system will not use interrogate/reply Mode S
capabilities as part of the security scheme.
3.7 Functional Analysis & Allocation
Allocating performance requirements, design requirements, and constraints to functions
is the next step in the development process. This is best visualized via Table 2. A brief
discussion on the impact of the allocated requirements upon the functions is warranted.
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Table 2. Functional Allocation
Function Perf Reqts / Design Reqts / Constraints
FR-1 ID Anonymization CR-1 Interoperable
CR-2 Remain broadcast, no contract
DR-2 No change to phy layer
PR-1 P(Collision) ≤ 0.1
PR-2 ≥ 6.2 messages/second throughput
FR-2 Data Obfuscation CR-1 Interoperable
CR-2 Remain broadcast, no contract
DR-2 No change to phy layer
DR-3 NIST recommended
DR-4 No key distribution
PR-2 ≥ 6.2 messages/second throughput
PR-3 Brute-force safe ≥25 years
FR-3 Mode Selection FR-3 Manually selectable between all three
PR-4 Select Clear, No ID, and No ID or Pos
PR-5 RA & ≤2 NM & ≤2000 ft, Pos Clear
FR-4 Baseline Mode S-ES CR-1 Interoperable
DR-1 IAW DO-181 and DO-260
3.7.1 Identification Anonymization.
Each aircraft participating in ADS-B has a globally unique 24-bit ICAO address that is
used in every Mode S packet transmitted. These addresses are assigned to national govern-
ments in blocks by ICAO. In turn, most governments abide by the provision stipulated by
ICAO that an address be permanently assigned to an airframe. Some exceptions are made
for military aircraft which have hardware or software programable addresses that are taken
from a block assigned to a specific military service or unit by their government [93]. Each
nation keeps a database matching addresses to registration, which often includes personal
or corporation names and contact information. This database is generally made available
to the public.
To anonymize this address while keeping it unique requires random selection of a ses-
sion address from a uniform distribution. To ensure this selection does not collide with
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existing addresses, a block of addresses must be set aside for use within this anonymization
scheme. While the choice of block is a policy decision, [94] states that “aircraft addresses
starting with bit combinations 1011, 1101 and 1111 have been reserved for future use.”
A randomly selected ephemeral address is henceforth described as a session unique ICAO
address (SUIA).
CR-1: Interoperability is maintained because valid 24-bit addresses are used.
CR-2: The lack of an acknowledgement channel may impact the ability of the system to
avoid collisions among SUIAs. See PR-1 below.
DR-2: The address change does not impact compliance with physical layer specifications.
PR-1: Assume a growth to 20,000 aircraft airborne globally. Using the block 1111 11 allows
an 18-bit SUIA. Therefore P(collision)= 20000218 =
20000
2662144 = 0.0763≤ 0.1. This worst
case assumes every aircraft is using the security features and that there is no isolation
between regions.
PR-2: Once a SUIA is generated, using it will likely incur no additional throughput limita-
tions over an assigned address (depending on transponder implementation).
3.7.2 Data Obfuscation.
Robust encryption provides a secure way to obfuscate data. The requirements and con-
straints severely restrict which ciphers and cryptosystems are available for implementation.
A cryptographic solution:
CR-1: Requires FPE of some type.
CR-2: Requires key distribution or key generation on the broadcasting platform.
DR-3: Requires the use of a NIST recommended cipher.
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DR-4: Requires the use of a public-key or hybrid encryption system.
PR-2: Requires the use of symmetric encryption.
FF1 is the designation for the only NIST recommended FPE cipher. A draft version
of FF1 was previously validated for use in ADS-B in [21], [22], and [95]. Unfortunately,
using FF1 on its own requires key distribution. To meet all requirements, FF1 must be used
within a hybrid cryptosystem.
Generally, hybrid cryptosystems use public key technology to agree upon a shared se-
cret which can be used as a symmetric key, removing the requirement for symmetric key
distribution. Unfortunately, hybrid cryptosystems often rely on certificate based systems
to distribute public/private key pairs, thereby requiring significant two-way connectivity.
CR-2 compliance requires the innovation of a modified hybrid cryptosystem. This is en-
abled by the CIA decomposition discussed in Chapter II. It is possible to encrypt a message
with a public key and have it decrypted with a private key without requiring a signature or
key agreement algorithm. This allows the combination of key transport using public key
encryption with FPE, discussed further below.
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prerequisites are omitted from the above notation, such as the underlying block cipher, the
designation of CIPHK, and the base for the numeral strings.
4.5 Feist l Structure
FFX schemes, including FF1 and FF3, are based on the Feistel structure. The Feistel structure
consists of several iterations, called rounds, of a reversible transformation. The transformation 
consists of three steps: 1) the data is split into two parts; 2) a keyed function, called the round 
function, is applied to one part of the data in order to modify the other part of the data; and 3) the
roles of the two parts are swapped for the next round. The structure is illustrated in Figure 1
below, for both encryption and d c yption. Four rounds are shown in Figure 1, but ten rounds are
actually specified for FF1, and eight rounds for FF3.
u!characters! v!characters! u!characters! v!characters! 
A0! B0! A4!! B4! 
B1!←!C0! A1!←!B0! 
FK!+! n,!T,!0! 
FK! +!n,!T,!1! 
A2!←!B1! B2!←!C1! 
B3!←!C2! A3!←!B2! 
FK!+! n,!T,!2! 
B3!←!A4! A3!! 
FK! _!n,!T,!3! 
n,!T,!2! 
A2!! B2!←!A3! 
FK!_! 
n,!T,!1! 
B1!←!A2! A1! 
FK! _! 
FK! +!
! 
n,!T,!3! 
!1
FK!_! n,!T,!0! 
A4!←!B3! B4!←!C3 A0! B0!←!AEncryption! Decryption! 
Figure 1: Feistel Structure
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Figure 15. FF1 Feistel Structure
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3.7.3 Mode Selection.
Mode selection, discussed further in design synthesis, is a simple exercise in loading
message registers with different data based on the selected mode. Criteria for automatic
mode selection (PR-5) can be implemented along with a user interface for manual mode
selection (FR-3).
The multitude of flight management systems (FMSs) and transponders in use across the
global aircraft fleet would require significant discussion of user interfaces and their design.
Most deployed devices have the capability to change their user interface via firmware or
software updates. An analysis of user experience and human factors is beyond the scope of
this research.
3.7.4 Baseline Mode S.
The discussion on implementing currently ratified Mode S standard is not directly re-
lated to this research. Additional interoperability considerations arise in design synthesis;
further discussion on baseline Mode S can be found in [8] and [9].
3.8 Synthesis & Results
Design synthesis is the process by which concepts or designs are developed based on
the output of functional analysis and allocation. Allocating requirements to functions made
some key subsystem design decisions clear in that phase. Here, the SUIA and cryptographic
designs are synthesized with Mode S-ES into a confidentiality protocol summarized by
Figure 16. This concept shows the existing Mode S-ES components and operations in gray.
The colored portions are discussed in this section.
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D
F-17
ICAO SUIA SSK
A63C51 FCE8DB A8…15
A1E0B2 FFA1CA 9F…CB
A2D96E FDF56B 51…A1
DF-17
DF-17 All Others 
DF-23 Key Passage
DF-15 ID & Location 
DF-23 Key Passage 
DF-15 Identification
DF-17 All Others 
TCAS /ACAS
Intact
Secure
Software
Module
Figure 16. Operational Concept (OV-1)
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3.8.1 ICAO Address Anonymization.
The session unique ICAO address (SUIA) concept discussed previously enables anony-
mous Mode S operation.
3.8.2 Data Encryption.
This proposal makes use of FF1 as the symmetric encryption mode. The symmetric key
used to accomplish encryption is generated on-board the participating aircraft along with
an SUIA and is called a session symmetric key (SSK).
3.8.3 SUIA & SSK Handoff.
The use of symmetric encryption and unique identifiers requires a method of sharing
both an SUIA and SSK between a participating aircraft and the ground-based surveillance
infrastructure.
Alice (Aircraft) Bob (ATC)
create key pair (kpub,kpr)
kpub
choose random ksym
y = ekpub(ksym)
y
ksym = dkpr(y)
message m
z = FPEksym(m)
z
m = FPE−1ksym(z)
Figure 17. Broadcast Hybrid Encryption
As introduced above, a lightweight solution to transporting cryptographic keys is unidi-
rectional public key encryption (Figure 17). The broadcast, stateless nature of Mode S-ES
lends itself to this construct. ATC or the CAA generate a public/private key pair and publish
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the public key, potentially with the region’s 28 day flight information cycle. The aircraft
wishing to participate securely generates an SUIA and SSK on board and encrypts them
using the aforementioned public key. This data is transmitted to ATC, who now possesses
both the SUIA and SSK. With these, they are able to correlate anonymous packets to a
specific ICAO address and decrypt those ‘ME’ fields which were transmitted encrypted.
This proposal assumes that ground based infrastructure is capable of secure key han-
dling among clients, e.g., in the US, the FAA and North American Aerospace Defense
Command (NORAD) can share SUIAs and SSKs within the ATC and air defense networks
without revealing them to untrusted third parties or users. It also assumes that an entropy
source sufficient to the level of security required exists or can exist in on-board avionics
systems.
While a specific asymmetric encryption algorithm is not specified, current elliptic curve
based schemes have minimum block sizes of 512 bits. These 512 bits can be divided into
12 Mode S-ES packets.
3.8.4 Key Handoff Transmission Methods.
Several potential methods of transmission exist, each with advantages and disadvan-
tages:
• Mode S-ES Packets This method is assumed for the remainder of Chapter III and is
the impetus for the research in Chapter IV. This is advantageous because all required
infrastructure is currently in place. SUIAs and SSKs can be updated in real-time,
anytime during a session. The disadvantage is the increased spectrum use driven by
the PER research discussed in Chapter IV.
• IP During Mission Planning This method is less flexible because keys are generated
and handed off during mission planning over an internet based system. There is
currently no infrastructure in place to support this, however development would be
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relatively simple and low-cost. Once a preset list of keys is exhausted airborne, there
is no ability to generate and pass new keys.
• IP Real Time This overcomes the finite set of keys issue, however not all aircraft are
equipped with airborne internet access. It also requires the transponder to interact
with the internet source, thereby increasing the cost and complexity of equipping
aircraft with this capability.
• Phase Overlay DO-260C, the draft revision to Mode S-ES standards, incorporates
a capability to encode up to three bits using phase modulation on top of each ampli-
tude modulated bit in a Mode S-ES packet. It also includes forward error correction
(FEC), dramatically reducing the overhead required to successfully accomplish a key
handoff via broadcast on 1090 MHz. This will be discussed further in Chapter V.
If a key handoff is unsuccessful after the certain number of attempts, this results in the
aircraft not appearing on the controller’s display and the controller is notified (using current
or specialized notifications). The controller can then direct the aircrew to re-attempt the
handoff using standard voice communications verbiage. This process will also occur if an
aircraft attempts a handoff in which the generated SUIA collides with an existing SUIA.
3.8.5 Message Formats.
Message: an abstract term used to denote the communication of certain data, without ref-
erence to a particular technical part of the Mode S protocol
Packet: a 120µs data unit consisting of a 8µs preamble and 56 or 112 bits of data
Handoff: a data unit used for key handoff that is divided into packets prior to transmission
and reassembled upon receipt
ME Field: the content-containing payload of a Mode S-ES packet
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Mode S uses downlink formats (DFs) to determine the size, type, and purpose of each
data packet. A DF-17 denotes a 112-bit extended squitter packet whose purpose is ADS-B.
A DF-18 follows roughly the same format, but originates from a non-transponder source.
All DF-17 packets have the same structure, depicted in Figure 18. The payload is known
as the ME field. There are currently 32 ME field content sets [9].
0 1111 CA: 3 SUIA: 24 Ciphertext ME: 56 PI: 24DF-15 Encrypted ES
1 0001 CA: 3 ICAO or SUIA: 24 Plaintext ME: 56 PI: 24DF-17 Extended Squitter
1 0110 ICAO: 24 Att: 7 Seq: 5 Data: 44 PI: 24DF-23 Key Handoff
Figure 18. Added Reply Formats
In this proposed protocol, only the ME field is encrypted. This allows the system to
selectively encrypt based on message type. For example, if a user is in a mode that masks
identity, but does not deny location information, the transponder would only encrypt pack-
ets that contain an identification ME field.
3.8.6 Ground Infrastructure.
Besides firmware or software updates for the transponders of those wishing to utilize
confidential ADS-B, the ground segment receives the biggest addition. A secure software
module is added, acting as a filter for incoming Mode S packets. This module is self
contained, possessing a lookup table, capability to populate the table from key handoff
segments, and a translation method. Any packet that has a normal ICAO address and DF
passes through unmodified, shown in line 19 of Algorithm 1. A packet with an SUIA has
its address field replaced with the actual ICAO address, shown in line 17. A packet that is
encrypted has its address replaced, DF set to 17 (or as required), and ME field decrypted,
shown in line 12. This is then forwarded as a normal DF-17 to current ATC software. If a
DF-23 is received (line 7), the look up table is populated.
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ME Field: the content-containing payload of a Mode S-ES
packet
Mode S uses downlink formats (DFs) to determine the size,
type, and purpose of each data packet. This DF always
consists of the first five bits of a packet. A DF-17 denotes a
112-bit extended squitter packet whose purpose is ADS-B. A
DF-18 follows roughly the same format, but originates from a
non-transponder source. This confidentiality proposal can be
applied to most DFs; we use the case of ADS-B here due to
its broadcast nature and widespread use. Also, in designing
the protocol, unused DFs are brought into service arbitrarily.
A future RTCA committee could allocate them as necessary.
All DF-17 packets have the same structure, depicted in Fig. 5.
This structure consists of the DF, capability, address, payload,
and checksum. The payload is known as the ME field. The
ME field is determined by a type and sub-type code, with 32
types currently defined [14].
In our proposed protocol, only the ME field is encrypted. This
allows the system to selectively encrypt based on message
type. For example, if a user is in a mode that masks iden-
tity, but does not deny location information, the transponder
would only encrypt packets that contain an Aircraft Identifi-
cation and Category Message.
0 1111 CA: 3 SUIA: 24 Ciphertext ME: 56 PI: 24DF-15 Encrypted ES
1 0001 CA: 3 ICAO or SUIA: 24 Plaintext ME: 56 PI: 24DF-17 Extended Squitter
1 0110 ICAO: 24 Att: 6 Seq: 5 Data: 48 PI: 24DF-23 Key Handoff
Figure 12. Added Reply Formats
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Figure 5. Added Reply Formats
Ground Infrastructure
Besides firmware or software updates for the transponders
of those wishing to utilize confidential ADS-B, the ground
segment receives the biggest addition. We propose a secure
software module which acts as a filter for incoming Mode S
packets, as shown in algorithm 1. This module is self con-
tained, possessing a lookup table, capability to populate the
table from key handoff segments, and a translation method.
Any packet that has a normal ICAO address and DF passes
through unmodified. A packet with an SUIA has its address
field replaced with the actual ICAO address. A packet that
is encrypted has its address replaced, DF set to 17 (or as
required), and ME field decrypted. This is then forwarded
as a normal DF-17 to current ATC software.
Interoperability
Modern air surveillance technology accomplishes two core
functions:
• Allow ground infrastructure to track aircraft movement
and status
• Allow aircraft to automatically or manually avoid colli-
sions among themselves
The ground infrastructure requires continuous knowledge of
identification and precise location of each aircraft. The
proposed protocol allows this by assuming that ground in-
frastructure (ATC/CAA/Air Defense) is trusted by the user
and maintains internal trust among systems. Even if the user
does not actually trust them, a prerequisite for using airspace
is to contractually trust the authorities.
Algorithm 1 Secure Software Module
1: procedure PACKETFILTER
2: packet← Incoming Mode S Packet, Post CRC
3:
4: if packet.addr ≥ 0xFC0000 & ≤ 0xFFFFFF then
5: suia← true
6:
7: if packet.df = 23 then
8: addr, suia, sk, complete← AssembleSegment(packet)
9: if complete = true then
10: AddEntryToTable(addr, suia, sk)
11: return
12: else if packet.df = 15 then
13: key ← LookupKey(suia)
14: packet.meField← Decrypt(meField, key)
15: packet.addr ← LookupIcaoAddr(suia)
16: packet.df ← 17
17: else if suia = true then
18: packet.addr ← LookupIcaoAddr(suia)
19: else
20: No Changes to Packet
21:
22: return packet
On the other hand, any receiver of information besides the
aforementioned authorities is untrusted by default. Other
aircraft require some knowledge in order to avoid collisions.
Required knowledge of identification is limited to size and
required knowledge of precise position increases with prox-
imity to other aircraft. This protocol allows interoperability
in several ways:
• TCAS: Even with ES packets encrypted, DF-16 TCAS
packets are unaffected. Enabling hybrid surveillance
mode may require using an SUIA with TCAS packets, a
trivial modification to this scheme.
• TIS-B: ATC can re-transmit received DF-17 and non
ADS-B information as DF-18, a service known as traffic
information service broadcast (TIS-B). There is already a
capability to anonymize or block these re-transmissions
which could be extended to include confidential DF-17
participants.
• Phase of Flight Discrimination: Whether confidential
participants are obfuscating identification only or also
encrypting location information can be adjusted based on
phase of flight. This will be a policy decision of CAAs
and operators. For example, military aircraft who require
confidentiality while executing tactics could broadcast
plaintext location with obfuscated ID while transiting to
and from special use airspace (SUAS). When established
in the airspace, these aircraft would encrypt their location,
allowing safety monitoring from controllers and security
from adversaries. Another example is a corporate aircraft.
Using an SUIA the entire flight, the aircraft could use
plaintext location while in the congested airspace that
contains potential visual flight rules (VFR) traffic, then
obfuscate location while en route in instrument flight rules
(IFR) only airspace. If the aircraft re-accomplishes a key
handoff while en route, their SUIA will be different at
their arrival location.
• Auto Proximity Mode: It is likely that a relatively low
percentage of aircraft will have a requirement for confi-
dentiality. Auto proximity mode would have an aircraft
encrypting their location unless a traffic conflict is de-
tected (with ADS-B or TCAS) within a certain horizontal
and vertical proximity. The aircraft would then broadcast
plaintext location (still using an SUIA) until the conflict
has passed.
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3.8.7 Interoperability.
Modern air surveillance technol gy accomplishes two cor functions:
• Allow ground infrastructure to track aircraft movement and status
• Allow aircraft to automatically or manually avoid collisions among themselves
The ground infrastructure requires continuous knowledge of identification and precise
location of each aircraft. The proposed protocol allows this by as uming that ground infras-
tructure (ATC/CAA/Air Defense) is trusted by the user and maint ins internal trust among
systems. Even if the user does not actually trust them, a prerequisite for using airspace is
to contractually trust the authorities.
On the other hand, any receiver of information besides the aforementioned authorities
is untrusted by default. Other aircraft require some knowledge in order to avoid collisions.
Required knowledge of identification is limited to size and required kn wledge of precise
position increases with proximity to other aircr ft. This pr tocol allows interoperability in
several ways:
42
• TCAS: Even with Mode S-ES packets encrypted, DF-16 TCAS packets are unaf-
fected. Enabling hybrid surveillance mode may require using an SUIA with TCAS
packets, a trivial modification to this scheme.
• TIS-B: ATC can re-transmit received DF-17 and non ADS-B information as DF-18,
a service known as traffic information service broadcast (TIS-B). There is already a
capability to anonymize or block these re-transmissions which could be extended to
include confidential DF-17 participants.
• Phase of Flight Discrimination: Whether confidential participants are obfuscating
identification only or also encrypting location information can be adjusted based on
phase of flight. This will be a policy decision of CAAs and operators. For exam-
ple, military aircraft who require confidentiality while executing tactics could broad-
cast plaintext location with obfuscated ID while transiting to and from special use
airspace. When established in the airspace, these aircraft would encrypt their lo-
cation, allowing safety monitoring from controllers and security from adversaries.
Another example is a corporate aircraft. Using an SUIA the entire flight, the aircraft
could use plaintext location while in the congested airspace that contains potential
visual flight rules (VFR) traffic, then obfuscate location while en route in instrument
flight rules (IFR) only airspace. If the aircraft re-accomplishes a key handoff while
en route, their SUIA will be different at their arrival location.
• Auto Proximity Mode: It is likely that a relatively low percentage of aircraft will
have a requirement for confidentiality. Auto proximity mode would have an aircraft
encrypting their location unless a traffic conflict is detected (with ADS-B or TCAS)
within a certain horizontal and vertical proximity. The aircraft would then broadcast
plaintext location (still using an SUIA) until the conflict has passed.
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Each of these methods of achieving interoperability must be used with careful under-
standing of the trade-off between the safety gained and security lost. This protocol allows
seamless integration of each user’s unique confidentiality or security requirements while
efficiently preserving the core functions of air surveillance (Figure 16).
3.8.8 Overall Synthesis.
All of these considerations are brought together in Figure 19. It shows the roles of the
user (who is in the aircraft), secure software module (on the ground), and air traffic con-
troller. The information flow for both the key handoff and subsequent secure or anonymous
operations are shown in relation to one another. An example of lookup table referenced is
depicted in Figure 16.
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Key Generation
CAA or ATC
Generate key pair (kpub,kpr)
Publish kpub with aeronautical data
Distribute kpr to trusted agencies
Key Loading
User or Maintenance
Load kpub into FMS or Transponder
User Init Session
User
UI input to execute key passage
No success/fail acknowledgement
Begin using encrypted mode
ATC Init Session
ATC Secure Software Module
Receive series of DF-23 packets
Attempt to reconstruct SUIA & SSK
All packets received and
able to reconstruct?
Duplicate SUIA entry?
Enter Into Translation Table
ATC Secure Software Module
Ready to receive messages
Transmit Mode S-ES
User
DF-17 w/ ICAO = Cleartext
DF-15 w/ SUIA = Encrypted
DF-17 w/ SUIA = ID Obfuscated
Receive Mode S Message
Current ATC Software
DF-23?
DF-15?
Any DF with SUIA?
Decrypt
ATC Secure Software Module
Lookup key using SUIA
Decrypt fields
Change DF to 17
Translate ID
ATC Secure Software Module
Lookup ICAO address using SUIA
Replace SUIA with ICAO address
Process Mode S Message
Current ATC Software
Current ATC software sees DF-17s
(or other Mode S message DFs)
Notify Controller
Current ATC Software
Use current alerts OR
Use new alert for bad crypto
Controller Notify User
Controller
Current or new phraseology IAW
FAA JO 7110.65 5-2-15/25/26
or equivalent
Controller
User
Current ATC Software
Secure Software Module
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
Failed Table Lookup
Figure 19. Operational Flow Diagram (OV-6)
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3.8.9 Development & Deployment.
A discussion on the actual details of the development, testing, and deployment of new
software or firmware for each of the different integrated avionics systems and transponders
is beyond the scope of this research. There are challenges associated with modification:
processing power for cryptographic operations, entropy sources, user interface design, etc.
A key to this protocol is that those challenges exist only for those systems used by cus-
tomers desiring confidentiality.
Likewise, an in depth discussion on the same process for ground segment software is
not viable here. Ideally, a modification such as the one proposed here is implemented as a
software only update.
The process to discuss and ratify additional standards in RTCA documents is poten-
tially lengthy, but necessary to formalize this proposal and iterate to a point of operational
feasibility and security. It is important to bring security and cryptographic experts into that
process early.
3.9 Conclusion
This research presents a technical solution which would allow an interoperable im-
plementation of cryptographic confidentiality over the Mode S-ES protocol. The use of
a hybrid encryption system in which each packet retains its structure yet has a payload
encrypted with FPE maintains compatibility with currently deployed systems. A unidi-
rectional key generation and handoff solution removes the need for certificates and key
distribution to each individual user. Remaining technical challenges include the on-aircraft
generation of cryptographically secure pseudo-random numbers (CSPRN) and the method-
ology for key handoff transmission. Chapter IV investigates the viability of the specific key
handoff transmission method suggested here.
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IV. Key Handoff Characterization
4.1 Introduction
The protocol developed in Chapter III utilizes a key handoff in which data flows in a
single direction. On the presentation layer, this is by design. Key distribution issues are
avoided by using unidirectional key handoff. On the transport and session layers, this is
a significant limitation. Mode S-ES is unidirectional: data is broadcast from one node
(aircraft) to other nodes (ground stations and other aircraft). Like the user datagram pro-
tocol (UDP), there is no handshaking and no guarantee of delivery or ordering. There is
no capability for a receiving node to acknowledge receipt of a packet or reply in any way.
Adding multi-node stateful sessions and transport to Mode S-ES would require a significant
overhaul of the protocol, violating the objectives as discussed in Chapter III.
The efforts discussed in this chapter are focused on answering the first part of the second
research question: What is the open-air Mode S-ES link performance and how does this
impact the real-world implementation of the proposed protocol? Modeling and simulation
as well as open-air flight test contributed to this effort.
4.1.1 Error Ratio.
Performance, in this case, refers to the error probabilities experienced by data moved
across Mode S-ES. Error probability, pe, is a common performance metric used to evaluate
digital communications. Error probability is approximated by error ratio, an experimentally
derived value [96]. Error ratio is defined as 1−rt where r is the quantity successfully received
and t is the quantity transmitted over a given time period.
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Three error ratios are of interest to this research:
• Bit Error Ratio (BER) ≈ peb
• Packet Error Ratio (PER) ≈ pep
• Handoff Error Ratio (HER) ≈ peh
BER is only of interest insofar as it drives PER and therefore is not directly measured
or analyzed here. PER is the normal performance indicator for Mode S-ES’s physical and
link layers. HER is a measurement unique to the work herein; it measures error as applied
to handoffs (sets of 12 packets in this case).
4.1.2 Noise.
Background noise is not a primary contributor to bit errors in Mode S packets. Mode
S-ES occupies 2 MHz of bandwidth centered at 1090 MHz. This falls within the 960-1164
MHz band which is internationally reserved for aeronautical use [97] of which 1090 MHz
is further set aside for transponder exclusive use. Measured man-made background noise
is lower than thermal noise on most frequencies in L-Band (1-2 GHz) [98]. Thermal noise,
the primary contributor to the background noise floor at 1090 MHz, is
Pbn = kBT = 8.28 ·10−15 Watts (1)
where k is Botlzmann’s constant, B = 2 MHz of bandwidth, and T = 300 K ≈ 80° F.
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4.1.3 Link Budget.
The received power, Pr =C must account for free space path loss:
C =
PtGtGrλ 2
(4pi)2R2L
(2)
where G are gains, L is losses, and R is range in meters. Assuming Pt = 177, isotropic
antennae, and negligible component losses:
C =
177λ 2
157.91R2
(3)
Assuming 1090 MHz, then λ = 0.28 meters.
C =
0.085
R2
(4)
Convert meters to nautical miles.
C =
0.000000025
R2NM
(5)
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4.1.4 Signal to Noise Ratio.
The resulting carrier sigal-to-noise ratio (SNR), CN , is shown in Figure 20:
C
N
=
0.000000025
R2NM
8.28 ·10−15 = 3019323.67
( 1
R2NM
)
(6)
Also shown is SNR per bit, EbN0 :
Eb
N0
=
C
N
· B
fb
(7)
Equation 8 assumes non-coherent detection due to the proliferation of non-coherent Mode
S receivers. The resulting theoretical BER [99] is shown in Figure 21.
BER≈ 1
2
e−
1
2 ·
Eb
N0 (8)
where fb = 1 Mb/s, the bit rate of Mode S-ES. Because limsnr→∞ peb = 0, the expected
BER and PER approach zero. Noise is not a significant contributor to errors in Mode S,
largely due to power requirements for transmitters.
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4.1.5 FRUIT.
The lack of a multiple access scheme for Mode S means that all nodes have access
to the channel at all times, essentially pseudo-random access. Depending on air traffic
density and composition in a given location, this causes severe interference which results in
relatively high PERs. This interference, caused by the superposition of multiple authorized
1 1 0 01 1 0 1 0 0 1 0
1 1 0 11 1 0 1 0 1 0 1
1 1 0 X1 1 0 1 0 X X X
Transmission A: F2216 Transmission B: F3516 Received Waveform
Figure 22. Interference Due to FRUIT
transmissions, is known as false replies unsynchronized in time (FRUIT). Figure 22 shows
an example of two superimposed transmissions at a receiver. In this case, the power levels
are identical, resulting in ambiguous bit values. In reality, power levels are unlikely be
identical; the symbol detector will choose a bit value which is potentially erroneous.
Figure 23 shows FRUIT rates gathered by an instrumented test aircraft flying within 150
NM of the Los Angeles Airport [100]. Figures 24 shows FRUIT rate data from a ground
receiver in Lexington, Massachusetts [63]. In these figures, and in this document, the terms
“FRUIT” and “replies” are used to refer to Mode S-ES broadcast transmissions as well,
even though they are not replying to interrogation. ATCRBS comprises of transponder
Modes 1-4 and C. Mode S includes both short and extended squitter transmissions.
Given that background noise is minimal and FRUIT rates are as high as 20,000 trans-
missions per second at -85 dBm, it is highly likely that FRUIT is the primary cause of bit
errors in Mode S-ES packets.
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extending for three hours on each day. FAA Air 
Traffic Controllers in Los Angeles assisted in 
determining the busiest times of day, in order for 
the tests to include the highest interference 
conditions. As a result, the flights were conducted 
between 11:OO PDT and 14:OO PDT on 16 June 
(Wednesday), 17 June (Thursday), and 18 June 
(Friday), and 14:OO PDT and 17:OO PDT on 19 June 
(Saturday). The general orientation of the flights is 
shown in Figure 2. Most flights were concentrated 
Figure 2. Flight tracks for the four participating 
aircraft are shown superimposed on a map of the 
Los Angeles Basin. 
within a triangle defined by LAX to the north, the 
navigational fix KUMBA to the southeast, and the 
navigational fix FICKY to the southwest. The 
UPSAT B727 (N904UPS) provided a limited 
number of flights that paralleled the coast. 
During most of the flights, one aircraft (usually 
N40) held at a fix 5 nmi north of LAX, flying at 
17,500 feet in a racetrack holding pattern oriented 
roughly east-west. The other ADS-B target aircraft 
(usually N49 and N189H) flew back and forth along 
an inverted V defined by FICKY to the southwest, 
MIDDS (near Long Beach) at the apex and northern 
extent of the pattern, and KUMBA to the southeast. 
Additionally, the UPS B727 flew the north-south 
routes along the coast. 
These flights were designed to provide a 
variety of test conditions. The aircraft holding over 
LAX would operate with the greatest number of 
interfering 1090 MHz replies, because of the high 
aircraft density and large number of beacon 
interrogators within view. The number of 
interfering replies would be expected to diminish 
substantially as aircraft flew offshore towards 
FICKY. The division of flights over land and water 
also provided an opportunity to observe any 
multipath degradation that might be attributed to 
operation over water. 
111. Results 
1090 MHz Reply Rates (Interference Rates) 
The amplitude and rate of Mode A/C ATCRBS 
and Mode S transponder replies, also known as 
fruit, were measured using DATAS, AMF, and the 
1090TB. Overall distributions are illustrated in 
Figures 3 and 4. Figure 4 illustrates the general 
repeatability of the measurements, and also exposes 
a modest asymmetry in the data. Recorded fruit 
rates on N40 were consistently about 10-20% 
higher when the aircraft was westbound in the hold. 
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Figure 3. ATCRBS and Mode S Fruit Rates as a 
Cumulative Distribution vs. Received Power. 
Each Point on the Fruit Rate Curve Represents 
the Sum of All Replies Whose Amplitude is 
Greater Than or Equal to the Corresponding 
Received Power. 
This is thought to be the result of the natural 
asymmetry in the aircraft distribution (many more 
aircraft are north and east of LAX, over land, than 
south and west of LAX, over water) and the 
asymmetric antenna gain pattern on N40, which 
was a consequence of mounting the antennas 
7.B.1-4 
Figure 23. FRUIT over LA Basin
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Figure 8. Fruit Environment, Measured at 
Lexington, MA. 
following reasoning. Whereas Mode A, C 
transmission standards allow the carrier 
frequency to deviate by as much as +/-3 MHz, 
for Mode S the deviation is +/-1 MHz. This 
allows a bandwidth( reduction for a receiver that 
is intended only for Mode S. Furthermore, for 
reception of Extended Squitters, it is not 
necessary to perform accurate time-of-arrival 
measurements and therefore the bandwidth can 
also be reduced for that reason. 
Measurements have been made using 
both 6 MHz and 4 MHz bandwidths. 
Preliminary comparisons have been made 
between these cases, yielding an indication that 
4 MHz bandwidth appears to be satisfactory. 
Mode S signals are still detectable, and the 
probability of correct reception is 
approximately the same as for 6 MHz. 
An objective of the measurement 
program was to gain experience with effects 
such as man-made noise that might limit 
performance when using a high-sensitivity 
receiver. In fact, the first data collection 
indicated a significant problem of interference, 
in a form that appeared to be a very high noise 
level. Using a spectrum analyzer, the noise was 
identified to be a signal transmitted by a newly 
installed cellular phone tower about a mile 
away. This transmits a very strong signal at 
about 960 MHz. The cellular interference was 
eliminated by addition of a more effective 
front-end filter centered on 1090 MHz. 
Subsequently, man-made interference of much 
lower levels has been observed in some of the 
data collections. Further investigations are on- 
going. 
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Figure 9. Performance Comparisons. 
Airborne measurements are also being 
made with this system. In November 1997, the 
receiver was installed in a Convair 580 aircraft 
for data acquisition in the Boston and New 
York areas. Analysis of the data indicates 
significant differences in the fruit environments 
relative to the ground-based environment 
described above. A major change expected is 
that the aircraft antenna gain (approximately 
0 dB) is much lower than the gain of the ground 
based antenna (approximately 7 a). 
Therefore, the fruit rate above a given power 
level would be lower airborne, and this effect 
was seen to be true in the airborne data. 
Another expectation was that New York would 
0-7803-5086-3 /98/$10.00 01998 IEEE G25-8 
Figure 24. FRUIT at Lexington
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4.2 Modeling & Simulation Methodology
Mode S-ES PER was first characterized using a simulation. This allowed predictions of
real-world performance and offered an opportunity to reduce the technical risk associated
with open-air experimentation.
4.2.1 Model.
The simulation utilized a model of the airspace around the Los Angeles (LA) basin with
three major components:
• Test Aircraft
• FRUIT Producing Aircraft
• Receiver Site
Figure 25 shows the overarching concept of the model. The green dot in the middle
represents a Mode S-ES receiver site. This site is collecting RF on 1090 MHz and decoding
packets. The blue line represents the flight path of the test aircraft whose packets are used
to determine PER. The red aircraft symbols are other aircraft who are also transmitting on
1090 MHz, producing FRUIT which will impact the decoding of the test aircraft’s packets.
Note that although Figure 25 is depicted with azimuth consideration, this is for conceptual
clarity. The model does not include antennae and therefore neither angle of arrival in
azimuth nor elevation are included factors. The traffic distribution shown in Figure 25
is an illustration; the actual model contained an average of 1276 aircraft per run. The test
aircraft had the following parameters:
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Range from Receiver: 10-150 NM
Altitude: Always Above RF Horizon
Transmitter Power: 200 Watts = 54 dBm
Transmission Rate: 20 Packets per Second
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FRUIT Producing 
Aircraft
Figure 25. Model Overview
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The FRUIT producing aircraft had the following parameters, based on FAA traffic data
[100]:
Quantity: N (5.25,1.41) per NM to 243 NM from Receiver
Altitude: N (10000,30000) feet (Negatives Removed)
Transmitter Class: 20% A0, 40% A1, 10% A2, 30% A3
Transmitter Power: A0: 70-140 W, A1/A2: 125-250 W, A3: 200-400 W
Transmission Spacing: N (Evenly,3000µs)
FRUIT Type: 83% Mode 3 and 17% Mode S
Aircraft whose range to receiver and altitude combination would put them below the RF
horizon were removed. Additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) at a level of -111 dBm
was used to create an RF background.
4.2.2 Simulation.
The model of the LA basin air traffic and RF environment was used to simulate recep-
tion of test packets and FRUIT. PER was determined based on successful decoding of test
packets. An SDR front end outputs a complex, discrete-time, digital representation of the
received signal. This simulation utilized the same representation, allowing the use of the
exact same receive software used in open-air test. In both cases, the SDR was commanded
to sample at six mega-samples per second or six samples per microsecond. Since each
encoded bit occupies one microsecond, this means there are six samples per bit. Over 1000
vectors, each representing FRUIT, noise, or the target signal were generated and summed.
This summed vector simulated the received waveform from an SDR and was processed by
the receive software.
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Table 3 shows an example of this process for two bits of data. Two microseconds are
shown, each containing six samples. The first four lines represent FRUIT. An average of
1275 FRUIT vectors were combined with a single noise vector and a single target vector.
The target “transmitted” a binary ‘00’, Manchester encoded into the target transmission.
Due to the energy introduced at the receiver by FRUIT, the output bits are ‘10’, showing a
bit error. Note that the values in the table are notional for clarity.
Table 3. Model Example
Sample # 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Mode A FRUIT 1.43 1.43 1.43 0 0 0 0 0 0 1.43 1.43 1.43
. . . 0.525 0.525 0.525 0.525 0.525 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.525
Mode S FRUIT 0.411 0.411 0.411 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.411 0.411 0.411
. . . 0 0 2.2 2.2 2.2 0 0 0 2.2 2.2 2.2 0
AWGN 0.000 0.001 0.004 0.002 0.006 0.000 0.008 0.003 0.008 0.006 0.007 0.001
Target Bits 0 0
Target Transmission 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1
Sum at Receiver 2.366 2.367 4.570 3.727 3.731 1.000 0.008 0.003 2.208 5.047 5.048 3.367
Bits at Receiver 1 0
Other than noise, the simulation did not use a model of the transmit and receive SDRs
analog front end or antenna. The simulation results were processed in the same manner as
open-air experimental data, detailed below.
4.3 Experimental Methodology
4.3.1 Overview.
Open-air test flights were conducted to gather real-world PER data in support of model
generation. The model generated from flight test data can be compared to the modeling and
simulation results, however, enough data was collected to determine the model from flight
test alone.
Test flights occurred using a T-38C aircraft equipped with the EATS, further detailed
in Appendix B. EATS allowed the test aircraft to transmit custom Mode S-ES packets on
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Figure 26. T-38C with RASCAL Pod
1090 MHz and was certified by regulators as compliant with physical layer Mode S-ES and
ADS-B specifications. These custom packets were received by four receivers located at two
ground stations; the positions of which were carefully selected to have a large difference
in relative FRUIT environment. The test aircraft flew a specific, repeatable flight profile
while remaining within the beam width of all antennas at both ground stations. Comparing
packets transmitted to packets received and decoded gives PER information.
4.3.2 Test Aircraft.
The test aircraft was a T-38C with a Reconfigurable Airborne Sensor, Communication,
and Laser (RASCAL) pod loaded on the centerline station. RASCAL pod power was
controlled via a control panel installed in the front cockpit. Test operations were conducted
via the EATS graphical user interface (GUI) installed on a Getac tablet in the rear cockpit,
connected to the pod by Ethernet. The EATS GUI allowed system operators to manipulate
the content of Mode S-ES packets while ensuring the transmitted waveform was compliant
with RTCA, DoD, FAA, and ATCRBS, IFF, Mark XII/XIIA SPO (AIMS) specifications.
Aircraft position was accessed by EATS software using a Bluetooth Global Positioning
System (GPS) receiver. Additional details of EATS are in Appendix B.
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4.3.3 Ground Stations.
Two ground stations were established south of the test airspace (the R-2508 complex).
The “high” FRUIT ground station was on top of a tower on Strawberry Peak, exposed to
FRUIT from air traffic in the LA basin to the south. The “low” FRUIT ground station
was on the north side of the San Bernardino mountains, masked from the LA traffic by
intervening terrain. Additional details and terrain masking profiles of the two locations
are in Appendix D. Each receiver site possessed one yagi (directional) antenna and one
dipole (omni) antenna. Transmissions were received by a SDR and processed by Matrix
Laboratory (MATLAB)-based receiver software on a laptop computer. Figure 27 shows the
low FRUIT ground station.
Yagi AntennaDipole Antenna
Laptops
BPFs
SDRs
Clear LOS Along 
Flight Path
Figure 27. Ground Station
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4.3.4 Flight Profile.
A specific flight profile was flown to ensure repeatability between test sorties. The flight
profile was designed to:
• Gather data between 10 and 150 NM
• Stay inside the combined beam width of all four antennae
• Use real-world representatives altitudes
• Conserve fuel
Figure 28 shows the resulting profile as a green line, Edwards Air Force Base (AFB)
in black, the R-2508 complex airspace in blue, and the ground stations are denoted “L”
and “H” for low and high FRUIT, respectively. Figure 29 shows the same profile overlaid
on the combined grounds station beam width. Altitudes varied from 12,500 feet within 20
NM of the ground stations and 28,000 feet when 150 NM from the ground stations. True
airspeed (KTAS) was maintained between 320 and 430 knots.
4.3.5 Data Collection.
After the test aircraft took off, but prior to beginning transmission, the ground stations
began recording data. SDRs fed in-phase and quadrature (I/Q) data to their respective lap-
tops via universal serial bus (USB) 3.0. MATLAB’s native SDR capability forwarded the
samples into a software-based matched filter for preamble detection. Upon preamble detec-
tion and time alignment, another matched filter decoded the Manchester encoded samples,
resulting in 56 or 112 bit binary output. Any packet which was not DF-17 (the format
transmitted by the test aircraft) was discarded. All DF-17s were further processed to de-
termine the originating ICAO address and compute the cyclic redundancy check (CRC)
checksum. If the CRC was successful (i.e. resulted in a zero), then the packet was logged
for post-processing, detailed below.
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4.4 Data Analysis
4.4.1 Background.
The goal of the previously discussed data collection was to use simulation or experi-
mental data to create a model which is useful for prediction of Mode S-ES PER perfor-
mance. Collected raw data is transformed into parameters specific to the transmission of
a given packet (independent variables) and decode success or failure (dependent/response
variable). In the case of binary error data, it is appropriate to use logistic regression analy-
sis to determine the model of interest. Logistic regression is useful for predictive analysis
when there is a relationship between a single binary dependent variable and one or more
nominal, ordinal, or interval independent variables [101].
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4.4.2 Data Consolidation and Transformation.
Each simulation run or flight produced transmit and receive logs containing all packets
transmitted from the aircraft and those received at each of four receivers. In total, each
flight generated five separate log files:
• Tx Log
• Rx Log - Low FRUIT / Omni Antenna
• Rx Log - Low FRUIT / Directional Antenna
• Rx Log - High FRUIT / Omni Antenna
• Rx Log - High FRUIT / Directional Antenna
Entries in each transmit log consisted of geographic position and packet payload. En-
tries in each receive log contained position, FRUIT environment, antenna type, and packet
payload. Figure 30 shows the contents of the log files. Direction of flight was determined
post-flight by analyzing whether aircraft range from the receiver sites was increasing or de-
creasing. During data processing, it was determined that antenna installation error caused
data gathered while the aircraft was pointing toward the ground station to be invalid. Final
results include only data gathered while the ground station was aft of the test aircraft.
Tx Log
Position Unused Payload
Rx Log
Position FRUIT Enviro Antenna Type Payload
Figure 30. Transmit and Receive Log Contents
The payload (ME Field) within each packet contained transmission rate, Julian date
(day, hour, minute, second, millisecond), key handoff attempt number, and packet sequence
number (Figure 31). The Julian date provided both a coherent time stamp of and an iden-
tifier unique to each message. This allowed synchronization of transmit and receive logs
without collisions.
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DF &CA ICAO Addr Unused Day Hour Minute Second Millis Attempt Sequence CRC
Figure 31. Packet Contents
At the conclusion of simulation runs or flight operations, all log files were consolidated
into a single transmit and single receive data file containing all of the collected data. For
each entry in the consolidated transmit log file a search was conducted on the receive log
file to find entries that matched the coherent time stamp of the transmission. A match indi-
cated successful packet transmission while a failed search indicated a packet error. These
were then transformed into a single file containing range, FRUIT environment, direction
of flight, antenna type, and binary success/error for each packet transmitted. Figure 32
shows the data transformation flow. Range was calculated using the logged World Geode-
tic System (WGS-84) coordinates and height above ellipsoid (HAE). Direction of flight
was determined by calculating the true heading between position fixes.
Tx Log
Position Tx Rate Payload
+
Rx Log
Position FRUIT Enviro Antenna Type Payload
⇓
Model Input
Range FRUIT Enviro Antenna Type Direction Success
Figure 32. Data Transformation
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4.4.3 Model Determination.
Logistic regression analysis was used to determine the model of interest. In the case of
this model for PER and HER, the response variable has two categories: success or error
and the following predictors:
• Range (Continuous: 8-150 NM)
• FRUIT Environment (Categorical: High, Low)
• Antenna Pattern (Categorical: Omni, Directional)
• Direction of Flight (Categorical: Inbound, Outbound)
Logistic regression is similar to linear regression in that one can derive it starting with:
y = βintx +βrr+β f f +βaa+βdd (9)
Unlike a linear regression, the logit function determines an expectation value for a binary
response. The natural exponent is used because binary data does not follow a normal
distribution and the expectation value must remain greater than zero:
y = eβintx+βrr+β f f+βaa+βdd (10)
A denominator larger than the numerator is used to ensure a value less than or equal to one:
y =
eβintx+βrr+β f f+βaa+βdd
1+ eβintx+βrr+β f f+βaa+βdd
(11)
Finally, because success ratio was directly measured and error ratio was of interest:
pe = y = 1−
(
eβintx+βrr+β f f+βaa+βdd
1+ eβintx+βrr+β f f+βaa+βdd
)
(12)
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The detailed derivation of of the logit function and it’s associated statistics is well docu-
mented [101] and beyond the scope of this chapter. Figure 33 shows the premise of logistic
regression graphically. The natural exponential function is shaped by the density of the
response samples at a given predictor value.
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Figure 33. Logistic Regression Concept
HER was calculated as a function of PER, assuming a key handoff containing n = 12
Mode S-ES packets:
peh = 1− (1− pep)n (13)
= 1− (1− pep)12 (14)
The use of analytical HER calculations requires the assumption that individual packets in a
handoff are independent from each other. This assumption is made given the long interval
between packet transmissions (≈143 milliseconds). If transmission rate were to increase
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dramatically, there is potentially a point where independence cannot be assumed.
The open-air flight test results have a minimum statistical confidence level of 0.9954.
Details of this derivation are in Appendix A. Because FRUIT was qualitatively determined,
this confidence level gives an estimate of the population mean only for test day conditions.
The confidence would predict the population mean on a different day if identical FRUIT
conditions were present, however there is no quantitative way of comparing test day FRUIT
condition to any other day. Further statistical analysis of the logistic regression model is in
Appendix A.
4.5 Limitations and Constraints
Several limitations and constraints have an impact on how operationally representative
the results are.
4.5.1 Transmit Antenna.
EATS is certified by AIMS as compliant with physical layer specifications. This cer-
tification was gained via laboratory demonstrations, not open-air testing. As such, the
certification applies to the RF signal as it arrives at the antenna inlet port. The antenna
is itself certified, however the combination of the antenna and pod were not tested in an
anechoic chamber to determine its combined polar response. This was due to both time
and cost constraints associated with the 412th Test Wing. The antenna gain is unknown at
each azimuth and therefore there exists a large discrepancy in results between directions of
flight. It is assumed that an operational antenna would have equal or better performance
to the ‘better’ azimuths of the test antenna. Consequence: Results are a lower bound on
operational PER.
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4.5.2 Transmit Power.
Integration of EATS on the T-38C resulted in a measured transmit power of 177 Watts.
Simulations were run using 200 Watts, disallowing a direct comparison of results. The
T-38C is capable of providing the required power, however time constraints prevented pod
integration troubleshooting. Time constraints also prevented the re-running of the simula-
tions at 177 Watts (it takes several days to run on the available hardware). Consequence:
Open-air results cannot be directly compared to simulation results.
4.5.3 Airspace Restrictions.
Agreements with ATC and FAA authorities prevented the test aircraft from proceed-
ing closer than eight NM from the ground stations. Consequence: Open-air data is not
available for the ranges between zero and eight NM.
4.5.4 FRUIT Rate Measurement.
The capability to quantitatively measure FRUIT exists, however was not available dur-
ing the time and at the location of the flight test. This results in test data which cannot
be standardized to conditions experienced in follow on tests or simulation conditions. The
data is useful as a general comparison and to verify that FRUIT is a significant factor.
Consequence: Data cannot be standardized.
4.5.5 Receiver Tech Stack.
Due to the integration of TPS objectives, receiver software was required to be written in
MATLAB. Limitations with MATLAB multi-threading prevented the implementation of a
pipelined receiver flow. This caused the SDR to drop≈ 42% of samples each second due to
buffer loss. This loss was characterized and found to be consistent, allowing a calibration
to be applied during post-processing. This factor of 1.7 assumes that the results in the first
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0.58 of a second are the same as the missing results in the remaining 0.42 of the second.
Consequence: Fewer samples contribute to statistical level of confidence, however this
did not significantly impact results. Additionally, the use of relatively inexpensive SDRs
at the ground station is not operationally representative. It is assumed that the tech stack
employed in operational recievers would have equal or better performance. Consequence:
Results are a lower bound on operational PER.
4.6 Results
The results of the simulation and open-air flight test are presented here as plot of error
ratio as a function of slant range between the aircraft and ground station. This presentation
is unique: traditional error ratio visualizations are plotted as a function of Eb/N0. Range is
a more operationally relevant metric and, given constant transmit power, is proportional to
Eb/N0. Additionally, using range clarifies that the plots are valid only for test day condi-
tions, generalizations cannot be made due to limitations on FRUIT measurement.
Error ratio plots are traditionally plotted with a logarithmic Y-axis. These plots use a
linear Y-axis; the significant error ratios of Mode S-ES are far more readable with a linear
axis. In all charts, lower on the Y-axis is considered better performance. Performance was
expected to decrease (error ratio increase) as range increases.
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4.6.1 Simulation Results.
Figure 34 shows the overall PER results of the simulation, without FRUIT rate con-
sidered as a factor. Also shown is a 95% confidence interval, a notation removed from
all follow-on figures due to the high minimum confidence level and improved readability.
Figure 35 shows the results with FRUIT rate as a factor. These plots are derived from the
model shown in Equation 15 using the coefficients shown in Table 4.
Pep = 1−
[
1− e
βintx+βrr+β f f
1+ eβintx+βrr
]
(15)
Table 4. Sim Model Coefficients
Range Range
FRUIT
β intx -1.122029515630627 -3.723220760070858
β r 0.010216479825975 0.012929782362101
β f - 0.767630655698848
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Figure 34. Simulation - Combined Results
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Figure 35. Simulation - FRUIT Rate Results
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4.6.2 Flight Test Results.
These plots are derived from the model shown in Equation 16 using the coefficients
shown in Table 5.
Pep = 1−
[(
1− e
βintx+βrr+β f f+βaa+βdd
1+ eβintx+βrr+β f f+βaa+βdd
)
1.7
]
(16)
Table 5. Flight Test Model Coefficients
Range Range Range Range Range Range Range Range
FRUIT Antenna Direction FRUIT FRUIT Antenna FRUIT
Antenna Direction Direction Antenna
Direction
β intx 1.088422157 0.32170932 1.36286078 3.88921704 0.59784947 3.08345370 4.19256129 3.38967477
β r 0.01756133 0.01697433 0.01757497 0.02088855 0.01698839 0.02037372 0.02091456 0.02040034
β f - 0.55304155 - - 0.55358029 0.59664200 - 0.59751668
β a - - -0.18140779 - -0.18305126 - -0.19863500 -0.20121717
β d - - - -1.86187977 - -1.87875095 -1.86398346 -1.88099134
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Figure 36. Flight Test - FRUIT Enviro Results
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Figure 37. Flight Test - Antenna Results
4.6.3 Derived HER Results.
Flight test was unable to determine an experimental HER due to the receiver limitations
described above. Using Equation 13, HER is calculated from the determined PER. This is
shown in Figure 39.
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4.6.4 Analysis.
What is the open-air Mode S-ES link performance and how does this impact the real-
world implementation of the proposed protocol? The preceding plots and data reveal a
lower bound on the performance of Mode S-ES when subject to test day conditions. If
the actual Mode S-ES PER matches the performance determined here, the utility of the
proposed packet switched key handoff mechanism is severely limited without modification.
Recall that key handoffs consist of 512 bits broken into 12 packets. All 12 packets
must be received to achieve a successful handoff. The process is not stateful and there is
no return channel with which to communicate packet status. The 12 packet sequence must
be repeated until a certain probability of success, ps is met. The actual probability used in
implementation is a question of desired performance but would likely be between 0.8 and
0.95. If a successful handoff is not re-constructed after the completion of these attempts,
another session is initiated (Figure 19). The ultimate metric of performance for a complete
key handoff is elapsed time. This is the total time from the initiation of a secure session
until all handoff attempts are complete. Several variables determine this time:
• Packets Per Attempt (assumed 12 for this research)
• Packet Transmission Rate (DO-260B calls for a maximum of 6.2 per second)
• Desired Probability of Success (0.9 is assumed unless otherwise noted)
• Packet Error Ratio
Packets per attempt is defined by the crypto scheme and PER is a characteristic of the
environment. The two remaining variables are those which can be manipulated to improve
time-based performance of a handoff. Table 6 shows the relative effect of decreasing ps
versus increasing packet transmission rate. It also makes clear the limited range an aircraft
could be from a grounds station while executing a handoff and still have an expectation of
success.
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Table 6. Time Performance
Range PER HER Attempts Total Packets Seconds Range PER HER Attempts Total Packets Seconds
10 0.31 0.98835 197 2364 381 10 0.31 0.98835 197 2364 1
15 0.35 0.99431 404 4848 782 15 0.35 0.99431 404 4848 2
20 0.39 0.99735 867 10404 1678 20 0.39 0.99735 867 10404 5
25 0.43 0.99882 1957 23484 3788 25 0.43 0.99882 1957 23484 12
30 0.47 0.99951 4686 56232 9070 30 0.47 0.99951 4686 56232 28
35 0.51 0.99981 12018 144216 23261 35 0.51 0.99981 12018 144216 72
40 0.54 0.99991 25651 307812 49647 40 0.54 0.99991 25651 307812 154
45 0.58 0.99997 76422 917064 147914 45 0.58 0.99997 76422 917064 459
ps = 0.9 PPS = 6.2 ps = 0.9 PPS = 2000
Range PER HER Attempts Total Packets Seconds Range PER HER Attempts Total Packets Seconds
10 0.31 0.98835 138 1656 267 10 0.31 0.98835 138 1656 1
15 0.35 0.99431 283 3396 548 15 0.35 0.99431 283 3396 2
20 0.39 0.99735 606 7272 1173 20 0.39 0.99735 606 7272 4
25 0.43 0.99882 1368 16416 2648 25 0.43 0.99882 1368 16416 8
30 0.47 0.99951 3276 39312 6341 30 0.47 0.99951 3276 39312 20
35 0.51 0.99981 8401 100812 16260 35 0.51 0.99981 8401 100812 50
40 0.54 0.99991 17930 215160 34703 40 0.54 0.99991 17930 215160 108
45 0.58 0.99997 53417 641004 103388 45 0.58 0.99997 53417 641004 321
ps = 0.8 PPS = 6.2 ps = 0.8 PPS = 2000
Based on the previously mentioned constraints, it is likely that PER with production
transmitters and receivers is significantly lower than the data here indicates. If so, this
would increase the maximum range for an effective handoff. Additionally, increasing
packet transmission rate (only for handoffs, not current Mode S packets) can lower the
time requirement for a handoff. Both of these efforts are necessary prior to making a feasi-
bility determination regarding the protocol in Chapter III.
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V. Conclusion
5.1 Packet Switching & PER
Mode S is a communications protocol which lacks a multiple access scheme on 1090
MHz. Dozens, if not hundreds, of users are transmitting on the same frequency at the
same time. This results in significant interference called false replies unsynchronized in
time (FRUIT). The effect of FRUIT is to dramatically increase the packet error ratio (PER)
compared to other digital communications techniques. A major effort of this research was
to characterize the PER of Mode S-ES in a real-world, open-air environment. Several
limitations detailed in Chapter IV caused the experimentally determined data to be a lower
bound for the PER expected on production equipment. The experimentally determined
PER is shown in Figure 40 and detailed in Chapter IV and Appendix E.
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Figure 40. Overall Open-Air PER Results
75
Given the data found in this experiment, open-ended packet switching is not a valuable
technique for use with Mode S-ES. In some limited circumstances, such as the case of
a key handoff where the number of packets is limited to 12 or less, packet switching is
potentially valuable. Further testing with production transmitters and receivers is required
to quantify the usefulness of packet switching as a key handoff mechanism. If testing
with production equipment yields results similar to those determined here, the key handoff
construct is severely limited in range (no more than 40 NM). This reduces the viability of
the key handoff portion of the confidentiality protocol proposed.
5.2 Confidentiality Protocol
Mode S-ES is devoid of security considerations. Data verification is accomplished via
multilateration in some select areas of responsibility. Availability is slightly protected by
high power levels and legacy backup systems. There are no authentication or confidentiality
provisions in Mode S. Many proposals to add security to ADS-B would require significant
changes to current specifications. By focusing solely on the problem of confidentiality, it
becomes feasible to create a simple, secure, and interoperable protocol which is backwards
compatible for current users.
Anonymity is gained by using an ephemeral, pseudo-random ICAO address known as a
session unique ICAO address (SUIA). This replaces the assigned ICAO address in all Mode
S packets transmitted in a session. Confidentiality or privacy are ensured by encrypting the
ME Field, or payload, of Mode S-ES packets. These are encrypted using NIST approved
format preserving encryption (FPE). The key used for encryption throughout the session is
known as a session symmetric key (SSK). Various levels of anonymity and confidentiality
can be achieved by selectively encrypting ME Fields based on their content. This is shown
in Figure 41.
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Figure 41. Operational Concept
Since confidentiality is the security tenet of interest and certificate based keys are often
infeasible when distribution is to the general public, a unique unidirectional key handoff
allows the transport of an SUIA and SSK. These parameters are generated on client avion-
ics and then encrypted using the trusted air traffic control (ATC) public key. They are then
transmitted to ATC for use throughout the remainder of the secure session. This transmis-
sion of the encrypted SUIA and SSK is the previously mentioned key handoff.
The use of unidirectional public key encryption for key handoff creates a challenge
because Mode S-ES does not have the capability to maintain a stateful connection or ac-
knowledge receipt of packets. The handoff is too large to be transmitted in a single packet,
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requiring alternative means of transmission. These alternatives include Internet Protocol
(IP) based transmission prior to or during flight, and an extension to Mode S-ES allow-
ing connectionless packet switching. This proposal, while compatible with any method of
transmission, maintains simplicity by using Mode S-ES packets to transport the key hand-
off to ATC. Packet switching on Mode S-ES is faced with the previously discussed PER
challenges.
5.3 Attack and Research Classification
The determination of requirements for the proposed protocol was largely driven by the
work accomplished to classify potential attacks and previous research into ADS-B secu-
rity solutions. Starting with the classic Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability tenants
of information security, Chapter II expanded integrity into authentication and verification.
Using this distinction allowed an analysis of threats and classification of most ADS-B se-
curity research, shown in Figure 13.
5.4 Synthesis
The proposed security protocol is a strong candidate for rapid implementation of con-
fidentiality while using Mode S-ES. It meets all requirements pertaining to simplicity and
interoperability while using proven cryptography. It is the only known proposal which uses
the decomposition of confidentiality from authentication to attain the required simplicity.
While the core of the protocol is sound, experimentally determined PER performance of
Mode S-ES places undesirable limitations on the key handoff execution described in Chap-
ter III. Range from an ADS-B ground station would be limited to 40 NM while executing
a handoff with a reasonable probability of success. Fortunately, there are several alterna-
tive handoff transmission techniques which can be easily substituted. Follow on research
should focus on evaluating these alternative methods.
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5.5 Future Work
5.5.1 Cryptographic Implementation.
Excellent work has been done to characterize the cryptographic strength of various FPE
algorithms. [95]. This work was accomplished prior to NIST approval and the algorithms
were changed slightly prior to approval [102]. Follow-on analysis of these algorithms
and potential hardware and software implementations is necessary to allow use in national
security operations.
5.5.2 Avionics Capability.
The proposed system requires CSPRN generation and encryption using on-board avion-
ics systems. Research into the availability of entropy sources and required computational
power is required to determine any limits on the implementation of this protocol in present-
day transponders.
5.5.3 Alternative Handoff Transmission.
At the time of publication, the latest revision to RTCA DO-260 is DO-260C and is
in draft status. DO-260C adds a phase overlay capability to the current standard. The
proposed addition uses eight phase shift keying (8PSK) to overlay three bits on each pulse.
FEC is also included in the proposal. Overall, 204 additional data bits are added to each
Mode S-ES packet. Implementation of key handoffs using the phase overlay would reduce
the number of packets required for a handoff from twelve to two. Assuming the PER
determined here or better, this would increase the handoff range to at least 120 NM. Even at
a worst case 0.9 PER, a handoff would only take 37 seconds if desired ps = 0.9. Additional
systems analysis is required to determine the viability of key handoffs via phase overlay.
IP based transmission is also available for key handoff. This could be done in mission
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planning or via on-board internet access. Significant disadvantages impact both and attack
the core objective of simplicity. Additional research could characterize the usefulness and
viability of an IP based key handoff.
5.5.4 Production Equipment PER.
Finally, there is value in determining the PER of Mode S-ES using production transmit-
ters and receivers. It would also be valuable to quantify FRUIT while these experiments are
taking place. These tests would require extensive coordination with the FAA if conducted
in the US and would likely need funding for instrumented aircraft and ground stations.
5.6 Final Remarks
ADS-B is the future of air surveillance and collision avoidance. The paradox of ADS-B
is that it implements modern and future applications with legacy digital communications
technology in an already congested spectrum. This paradigm leaves the global air trans-
port system with dated technology that is asked to carry growing amounts of data. Packets
include information such as identification, precise location, and status. This data is trans-
mitted without security considerations. The safety benefits of ADS-B are lost on operators
who do not use it due to lack of confidentiality. The economic impact of the lack of pri-
vacy is significant to many users. Safety and security go hand in hand, there cannot be
optimized safety without security considerations. This research proposes an interoperable
ADS-B confidentiality protocol which can be implemented in the near future and suggests
the necessary next steps toward implementation. Securing ADS-B is vital to achieve safe
and secure global air operations in the twenty first century.
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Appendix A. Additional Statistics
This appendix expands upon the introduction to the logistic regression analysis in Chap-
ter IV.
A.1 Statistical Level of Confidence
The minimum confidence level across the open-air data set is 0.9954. This is based on
the total quantity of samples collected across all open-air test sorties shown in Figure 42.
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Figure 42. Sample Quantity Per 1 NM Bin
Calculation of statistical level of confidence (SLC) is based on the binomial distribution
function:
Pn(k) =
n!
k!(n− k)! p
kqn− k (17)
where k is the number of errors in n attempts, p is the probability of an error, and
q = 1− p is the probability of a non-error.
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The cumulative binomial distribution gives the error ratio, P(e) when more or less than
N events occur in n attempts:
P(e≤ N) =
N
∑
k=0
n!
k!(n− k)! p
kqn−k (18)
P(e > N) =
n
∑
k=N+1
n!
k!(n− k)! p
kqn−k (19)
Using the cumulative distribution function, the level of confidence is:
SLC = P
(
e >
N
ph
)
= 1−
N
∑
k=0
n!
k!(n− k)! p
k
h(1− ph)n−k
Rearranging and using a natural logarithmic approximation for the cumulative distribu-
tion gives the total number of samples required for a given level of confidence:
n =
1
P(e)
[
− ln(1−SLC)+ ln
( N
∑
k=0
(n ·P(e))k
k!
)]
(20)
where n is the number of samples required, P(e) is the probability of error (PER or HER),
and N is the total number of detected errors.
A.2 Logistic Regression Statistics
A.2.1 P-Values.
The values in Tables 7 and 8 reveal that all independent variables investigated are sig-
nificant factors. In cases where P-Values were so small as to exceed the ability of a double
precision floating point to represent them, they are annotated as approaching zero: → 0.
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Table 7. Sim Model P-Values
Range Range
FRUIT
Pintx → 0 → 0
Pr → 0 → 0
P f - → 0
Table 8. Flight Test Model P-Values
Range Range Range Range Range Range Range Range
FRUIT Antenna Direction FRUIT FRUIT Antenna FRUIT
Antenna Direction Direction Antenna
Direction
Pintx → 0 7.2151 ·10−52 → 0 → 0 3.9832 ·10−96 → 0 → 0 → 0
Pr → 0 → 0 → 0 → 0 → 0 → 0 → 0 → 0
P f - → 0 - - → 0 → 0 - → 0
Pa - - 2.7155 ·10−46 - 1.0772 ·10−46 - 1.6220 ·10−50 3.7822 ·10−51
Pd - - - → 0 - → 0 → 0 → 0
83
Appendix B. Experimental ADS-B Testbed System
The Experimental ADS-B Testbed System (EATS) is a Mode S transmitter designed for
rapid, software-based prototyping of ADS-B improvements and variations. It uses software
defined radio (SDR) technology with off-the-shelf front end components to enable airborne,
open-air experimentation while remaining low cost.
EATS radio frequency (RF) components are optionally installed in a Reconfigurable
Airborne Sensor, Communication, and Laser (RASCAL) pod to enable external carriage
on F-16C/D, T-38C, or C-12J aircraft. The pod provides 15 Amperes of 28 volt direct
current power, passive thermal management, and on/off control for the RF components.
EATS utilizes an Ettus E310 SDR to allow researchers to execute rapid prototyping
while maintaining a standards compliant physical RF transmission. DoD AIMS has issued
a Recommendation for Frequency Assignment and a Recommendation for Stage 2 Radio
Frequency Authorization. These enable open-air testing on 1090 MHz provided the EATS
configuration does not change. Testing and certification of EATS was conducted by AIMS
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Figure 43. EATS Transmit Hardware
at Air Force Institute of Technology laboratories. These memorandums are included as
Appendix C.
The analog front end consists of the analog portions of the E310 signal path, filters,
amplifiers, and couplers. The front end was designed to provide 200 Watts of RF power at
the antenna connection. RASCAL electrical power voltage limits the actual output to 177
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Watts, still in the range of production Mode S transponders. The EATS block diagram is
shown in Figure 43.
Any computer equipped with Ethernet can provide I/Q data to EATS. If EATS is in-
stalled in a RASCAL and carried on an ejection seat aircraft, a tablet is required for safety.
A glove compatible touch-based user interface was used to accomplish this research. The
user interface is shown in Figure 44.
Further characterization is required to determine the performance of the RASCAL and
antenna combination. It was noted during testing that the antenna pattern was affected by
integration with the pod.
Figure 44. EATS Touch Interface
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Appendix C. AIMS Recommendations
The following memorandums document the Recommendation for Frequency Assign-
ment and Recommendation for Stage 2 Radio Frequency Authorization granted by DoD
AIMS.
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FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 
3. The DoD AIMS PO recommends frequency approval for the Experimental Automatic
Dependent Surveillance Broadcast Out 1090 MHz Extended Squitter (ADS-B) Testbed
(EAT) Transmitter Module Set (USRP Radio Part Number 156333D and Nuwaves Amplifier(s)
Part Number 30B015C) Software Version 1.3
4. The DoD AIMS PO points of contact are Mark Graves, (478) 327-4488, DSN 497-4488,
email: mark.graves.8.ctr@us.af.mil and Douglas Samples, (478) 926-3032, DSN 468-3032,
e-mail: douglas.samples.1.ctr@us.af.mil.
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Appendix D. Ground Stations
D.1 Introduction
Receiver site locations were vital to successful test operations. Two sites were selected
to provide a contrasting low and high FRUIT environment. Figure 45 is an overview map
of the low and high FRUIT sites within the San Bernardino National Forest.
L
H
Figure 45. Low and High FRUIT Receiver Sites
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D.2 Low FRUIT - Pilot Rock Trail Road
D.2.1 Description.
The low FRUIT receiver site was located along Pilot Rock Trail Road, also known as
2N33. This location provides terrain masking (Figure 46) to the majority of the LA basin
air traffic creating a low FRUIT environment.
D.2.2 Coordinates.
• 34°13.93’, -117°14.08’
D.2.3 Terrain Masking.
Figure 46 shows the masking profile for the low FRUIT receiver site (shown as a purple
‘x’). The orange line shows line-of-sight (LOS) to aircraft at 16,000 feet mean sea level
(MSL) and above. The blue line shows the line of sight to 30,000 feet MSL and above.
16,000 FEET
30,000 FEET
Figure 46. Low FRUIT Terrain Masking Profile
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D.3 High FRUIT - Strawberry Peak Fire Tower
D.3.1 Description.
The high FRUIT receiver site was located at the Strawberry Peak Fire Tower. This
location provided minimal terrain masking (Figure 47) to the majority of the LA basin air
traffic creating a high FRUIT environment.
D.3.2 Coordinates.
• 34°13.93’, -117°14.08’
D.3.3 Terrain Masking.
Figure 47 shows the masking profile for the low FRUIT receiver site (shown as a purple
‘x’). The orange line shows LOS to aircraft at 16,000 feet MSL and above. The blue line
shows the line of sight to 30,000 feet MSL and above.
16,000 FEET
30,000 FEET
Figure 47. High FRUIT Terrain Masking Profile
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Appendix E. Model Table
Pre-calculated tabular data is included here for ease of access. Tables 9 through 13
contain PER data rounded to the hundredths place.
Table 9. Tabular Model: 8-30 NM
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8 .62 .55 .71 .64 .59 .83 .29 .58 .52 .73 .68 .84 .33 .81 .25 .79 .19 .88 .43 .81 .23 .77 .14 .89 .47 .87 .39
9 .62 .55 .71 .65 .59 .83 .30 .58 .52 .73 .69 .85 .34 .82 .26 .79 .19 .88 .44 .81 .24 .78 .15 .89 .47 .87 .40
10 .63 .56 .71 .65 .60 .84 .31 .59 .53 .74 .69 .85 .35 .82 .27 .80 .20 .88 .44 .82 .25 .78 .16 .89 .48 .87 .41
11 .63 .56 .72 .66 .60 .84 .32 .59 .53 .74 .70 .85 .36 .82 .28 .80 .21 .88 .45 .82 .26 .78 .17 .90 .49 .87 .41
12 .64 .57 .72 .66 .61 .84 .32 .60 .54 .74 .70 .86 .36 .83 .28 .81 .22 .89 .46 .82 .26 .79 .18 .90 .50 .88 .42
13 .64 .57 .73 .67 .62 .84 .33 .60 .54 .75 .70 .86 .37 .83 .29 .81 .23 .89 .47 .83 .27 .79 .19 .90 .50 .88 .43
14 .65 .58 .73 .67 .62 .85 .34 .61 .55 .75 .71 .86 .38 .83 .30 .81 .24 .89 .47 .83 .28 .80 .20 .90 .51 .88 .44
15 .65 .58 .73 .68 .63 .85 .35 .61 .56 .75 .71 .86 .39 .84 .31 .82 .25 .89 .48 .83 .29 .80 .20 .90 .52 .88 .45
16 .66 .59 .74 .68 .63 .85 .36 .62 .56 .76 .72 .87 .40 .84 .32 .82 .26 .90 .49 .84 .30 .80 .21 .91 .53 .89 .45
17 .66 .60 .74 .68 .64 .86 .37 .62 .57 .76 .72 .87 .41 .84 .33 .82 .26 .90 .50 .84 .31 .81 .22 .91 .53 .89 .46
18 .66 .60 .74 .69 .64 .86 .37 .63 .57 .76 .72 .87 .41 .85 .34 .83 .27 .90 .50 .84 .31 .81 .23 .91 .54 .89 .47
19 .67 .61 .75 .69 .65 .86 .38 .63 .58 .77 .73 .87 .42 .85 .34 .83 .28 .90 .51 .84 .32 .81 .24 .91 .55 .89 .48
20 .67 .61 .75 .70 .65 .86 .39 .64 .58 .77 .73 .88 .43 .85 .35 .83 .29 .90 .52 .85 .33 .82 .25 .91 .55 .89 .48
21 .68 .62 .76 .70 .66 .87 .40 .64 .59 .77 .74 .88 .44 .85 .36 .83 .30 .90 .52 .85 .34 .82 .26 .91 .56 .90 .49
22 .68 .62 .76 .71 .66 .87 .41 .65 .59 .78 .74 .88 .45 .86 .37 .84 .31 .91 .53 .85 .35 .82 .26 .92 .57 .90 .50
23 .69 .63 .76 .71 .66 .87 .42 .65 .60 .78 .74 .88 .45 .86 .38 .84 .31 .91 .54 .86 .36 .83 .27 .92 .57 .90 .50
24 .69 .63 .77 .72 .67 .87 .42 .66 .60 .78 .75 .89 .46 .86 .39 .84 .32 .91 .55 .86 .36 .83 .28 .92 .58 .90 .51
25 .70 .64 .77 .72 .67 .88 .43 .66 .61 .79 .75 .89 .47 .87 .39 .85 .33 .91 .55 .86 .37 .83 .29 .92 .59 .90 .52
26 .70 .64 .77 .72 .68 .88 .44 .67 .61 .79 .75 .89 .48 .87 .40 .85 .34 .91 .56 .86 .38 .84 .30 .92 .59 .91 .53
27 .71 .65 .78 .73 .68 .88 .45 .67 .62 .79 .76 .89 .48 .87 .41 .85 .35 .92 .57 .87 .39 .84 .31 .92 .60 .91 .53
28 .71 .65 .78 .73 .69 .88 .45 .68 .62 .80 .76 .89 .49 .87 .42 .85 .36 .92 .57 .87 .40 .84 .32 .92 .60 .91 .54
29 .71 .65 .78 .74 .69 .89 .46 .68 .63 .80 .77 .90 .50 .88 .43 .86 .36 .92 .58 .87 .40 .84 .32 .93 .61 .91 .55
30 .72 .66 .79 .74 .70 .89 .47 .68 .63 .80 .77 .90 .51 .88 .43 .86 .37 .92 .59 .87 .41 .85 .33 .93 .62 .91 .55
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Table 10. Tabular Model: 31-60 NM
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31 .72 .66 .79 .74 .70 .89 .48 .69 .64 .81 .77 .90 .51 .88 .44 .86 .38 .92 .59 .88 .42 .85 .34 .93 .62 .91 .56
32 .73 .67 .79 .75 .71 .89 .49 .69 .64 .81 .78 .90 .52 .88 .45 .87 .39 .92 .60 .88 .43 .85 .35 .93 .63 .92 .57
33 .73 .67 .80 .75 .71 .89 .49 .70 .65 .81 .78 .90 .53 .88 .46 .87 .40 .92 .60 .88 .43 .86 .36 .93 .63 .92 .57
34 .73 .68 .80 .75 .71 .90 .50 .70 .65 .81 .78 .91 .54 .89 .47 .87 .40 .93 .61 .88 .44 .86 .36 .93 .64 .92 .58
35 .74 .68 .80 .76 .72 .90 .51 .71 .66 .82 .79 .91 .54 .89 .47 .87 .41 .93 .62 .88 .45 .86 .37 .93 .65 .92 .59
36 .74 .69 .80 .76 .72 .90 .51 .71 .66 .82 .79 .91 .55 .89 .48 .88 .42 .93 .62 .89 .46 .86 .38 .94 .65 .92 .59
37 .75 .69 .81 .77 .73 .90 .52 .71 .67 .82 .79 .91 .56 .89 .49 .88 .43 .93 .63 .89 .47 .87 .39 .94 .66 .92 .60
38 .75 .69 .81 .77 .73 .90 .53 .72 .67 .83 .79 .91 .56 .90 .50 .88 .43 .93 .63 .89 .47 .87 .40 .94 .66 .93 .61
39 .75 .70 .81 .77 .73 .91 .54 .72 .68 .83 .80 .92 .57 .90 .50 .88 .44 .93 .64 .89 .48 .87 .40 .94 .67 .93 .61
40 .76 .70 .82 .78 .74 .91 .54 .73 .68 .83 .80 .92 .58 .90 .51 .88 .45 .93 .65 .90 .49 .87 .41 .94 .67 .93 .62
41 .76 .71 .82 .78 .74 .91 .55 .73 .69 .83 .80 .92 .58 .90 .52 .89 .46 .94 .65 .90 .49 .88 .42 .94 .68 .93 .62
42 .76 .71 .82 .78 .75 .91 .56 .73 .69 .84 .81 .92 .59 .90 .52 .89 .47 .94 .66 .90 .50 .88 .43 .94 .68 .93 .63
43 .77 .72 .82 .79 .75 .91 .56 .74 .69 .84 .81 .92 .60 .91 .53 .89 .47 .94 .66 .90 .51 .88 .44 .94 .69 .93 .64
44 .77 .72 .83 .79 .75 .92 .57 .74 .70 .84 .81 .92 .60 .91 .54 .89 .48 .94 .67 .90 .52 .88 .44 .95 .69 .93 .64
45 .77 .72 .83 .79 .76 .92 .58 .74 .70 .84 .82 .92 .61 .91 .55 .89 .49 .94 .67 .90 .52 .88 .45 .95 .70 .93 .65
46 .78 .73 .83 .80 .76 .92 .58 .75 .71 .85 .82 .93 .61 .91 .55 .90 .49 .94 .68 .91 .53 .89 .46 .95 .70 .94 .65
47 .78 .73 .83 .80 .76 .92 .59 .75 .71 .85 .82 .93 .62 .91 .56 .90 .50 .94 .68 .91 .54 .89 .47 .95 .71 .94 .66
48 .78 .74 .84 .80 .77 .92 .60 .76 .71 .85 .82 .93 .63 .91 .57 .90 .51 .94 .69 .91 .54 .89 .47 .95 .71 .94 .66
49 .79 .74 .84 .80 .77 .92 .60 .76 .72 .85 .83 .93 .63 .92 .57 .90 .52 .94 .69 .91 .55 .89 .48 .95 .72 .94 .67
50 .79 .74 .84 .81 .77 .92 .61 .76 .72 .85 .83 .93 .64 .92 .58 .90 .52 .95 .70 .91 .56 .90 .49 .95 .72 .94 .67
51 .79 .75 .84 .81 .78 .93 .62 .77 .73 .86 .83 .93 .65 .92 .59 .91 .53 .95 .70 .92 .56 .90 .50 .95 .73 .94 .68
52 .80 .75 .85 .81 .78 .93 .62 .77 .73 .86 .83 .93 .65 .92 .59 .91 .54 .95 .71 .92 .57 .90 .50 .95 .73 .94 .69
53 .80 .75 .85 .82 .78 .93 .63 .77 .73 .86 .84 .94 .66 .92 .60 .91 .54 .95 .71 .92 .58 .90 .51 .95 .74 .94 .69
54 .80 .76 .85 .82 .79 .93 .63 .78 .74 .86 .84 .94 .66 .92 .61 .91 .55 .95 .72 .92 .58 .90 .52 .95 .74 .95 .70
55 .81 .76 .85 .82 .79 .93 .64 .78 .74 .87 .84 .94 .67 .93 .61 .91 .56 .95 .72 .92 .59 .90 .52 .96 .75 .95 .70
56 .81 .76 .86 .83 .79 .93 .65 .78 .75 .87 .84 .94 .67 .93 .62 .91 .56 .95 .73 .92 .60 .91 .53 .96 .75 .95 .71
57 .81 .77 .86 .83 .80 .93 .65 .79 .75 .87 .85 .94 .68 .93 .62 .92 .57 .95 .73 .92 .60 .91 .54 .96 .76 .95 .71
58 .82 .77 .86 .83 .80 .94 .66 .79 .75 .87 .85 .94 .68 .93 .63 .92 .58 .95 .74 .93 .61 .91 .54 .96 .76 .95 .72
59 .82 .77 .86 .83 .80 .94 .66 .79 .76 .87 .85 .94 .69 .93 .64 .92 .58 .95 .74 .93 .61 .91 .55 .96 .76 .95 .72
60 .82 .78 .86 .84 .81 .94 .67 .80 .76 .88 .85 .94 .70 .93 .64 .92 .59 .96 .75 .93 .62 .91 .56 .96 .77 .95 .72
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Table 11. Tabular Model: 61-90 NM
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61 .82 .78 .87 .84 .81 .94 .67 .80 .76 .88 .86 .95 .70 .93 .65 .92 .60 .96 .75 .93 .63 .92 .56 .96 .77 .95 .73
62 .83 .78 .87 .84 .81 .94 .68 .80 .77 .88 .86 .95 .71 .94 .65 .92 .60 .96 .76 .93 .63 .92 .57 .96 .78 .95 .73
63 .83 .79 .87 .84 .82 .94 .69 .80 .77 .88 .86 .95 .71 .94 .66 .93 .61 .96 .76 .93 .64 .92 .58 .96 .78 .95 .74
64 .83 .79 .87 .85 .82 .94 .69 .81 .77 .88 .86 .95 .72 .94 .67 .93 .61 .96 .76 .93 .64 .92 .58 .96 .78 .96 .74
65 .83 .79 .87 .85 .82 .94 .70 .81 .78 .89 .86 .95 .72 .94 .67 .93 .62 .96 .77 .94 .65 .92 .59 .96 .79 .96 .75
66 .84 .80 .88 .85 .82 .95 .70 .81 .78 .89 .87 .95 .73 .94 .68 .93 .63 .96 .77 .94 .66 .92 .60 .96 .79 .96 .75
67 .84 .80 .88 .85 .83 .95 .71 .82 .78 .89 .87 .95 .73 .94 .68 .93 .63 .96 .78 .94 .66 .92 .60 .97 .80 .96 .76
68 .84 .80 .88 .86 .83 .95 .71 .82 .79 .89 .87 .95 .73 .94 .69 .93 .64 .96 .78 .94 .67 .93 .61 .97 .80 .96 .76
69 .85 .81 .88 .86 .83 .95 .72 .82 .79 .89 .87 .95 .74 .94 .69 .93 .64 .96 .78 .94 .67 .93 .62 .97 .80 .96 .76
70 .85 .81 .88 .86 .83 .95 .72 .82 .79 .89 .87 .95 .74 .94 .70 .94 .65 .96 .79 .94 .68 .93 .62 .97 .81 .96 .77
71 .85 .81 .89 .86 .84 .95 .73 .83 .80 .90 .88 .96 .75 .95 .70 .94 .66 .96 .79 .94 .68 .93 .63 .97 .81 .96 .77
72 .85 .81 .89 .86 .84 .95 .73 .83 .80 .90 .88 .96 .75 .95 .71 .94 .66 .97 .79 .94 .69 .93 .63 .97 .81 .96 .78
73 .85 .82 .89 .87 .84 .95 .74 .83 .80 .90 .88 .96 .76 .95 .71 .94 .67 .97 .80 .94 .69 .93 .64 .97 .82 .96 .78
74 .86 .82 .89 .87 .85 .95 .74 .83 .80 .90 .88 .96 .76 .95 .72 .94 .67 .97 .80 .95 .70 .93 .65 .97 .82 .96 .78
75 .86 .82 .89 .87 .85 .95 .74 .84 .81 .90 .88 .96 .77 .95 .72 .94 .68 .97 .81 .95 .70 .94 .65 .97 .82 .96 .79
76 .86 .82 .89 .87 .85 .96 .75 .84 .81 .90 .89 .96 .77 .95 .73 .94 .68 .97 .81 .95 .71 .94 .66 .97 .83 .96 .79
77 .86 .83 .90 .88 .85 .96 .75 .84 .81 .91 .89 .96 .77 .95 .73 .94 .69 .97 .81 .95 .71 .94 .66 .97 .83 .97 .80
78 .87 .83 .90 .88 .85 .96 .76 .84 .82 .91 .89 .96 .78 .95 .74 .94 .69 .97 .82 .95 .72 .94 .67 .97 .83 .97 .80
79 .87 .83 .90 .88 .86 .96 .76 .85 .82 .91 .89 .96 .78 .95 .74 .95 .70 .97 .82 .95 .72 .94 .67 .97 .84 .97 .80
80 .87 .84 .90 .88 .86 .96 .77 .85 .82 .91 .89 .96 .79 .95 .75 .95 .70 .97 .82 .95 .73 .94 .68 .97 .84 .97 .81
81 .87 .84 .90 .88 .86 .96 .77 .85 .82 .91 .89 .96 .79 .96 .75 .95 .71 .97 .83 .95 .73 .94 .68 .97 .84 .97 .81
82 .87 .84 .90 .88 .86 .96 .77 .85 .83 .91 .90 .96 .79 .96 .76 .95 .71 .97 .83 .95 .74 .94 .69 .97 .84 .97 .81
83 .88 .84 .91 .89 .87 .96 .78 .86 .83 .91 .90 .97 .80 .96 .76 .95 .72 .97 .83 .95 .74 .94 .69 .97 .85 .97 .82
84 .88 .85 .91 .89 .87 .96 .78 .86 .83 .92 .90 .97 .80 .96 .76 .95 .72 .97 .84 .96 .75 .95 .70 .98 .85 .97 .82
85 .88 .85 .91 .89 .87 .96 .79 .86 .83 .92 .90 .97 .81 .96 .77 .95 .73 .97 .84 .96 .75 .95 .70 .98 .85 .97 .82
86 .88 .85 .91 .89 .87 .96 .79 .86 .84 .92 .90 .97 .81 .96 .77 .95 .73 .97 .84 .96 .75 .95 .71 .98 .86 .97 .83
87 .88 .85 .91 .89 .87 .96 .79 .86 .84 .92 .90 .97 .81 .96 .78 .95 .74 .97 .84 .96 .76 .95 .71 .98 .86 .97 .83
88 .89 .85 .91 .90 .88 .97 .80 .87 .84 .92 .91 .97 .82 .96 .78 .95 .74 .97 .85 .96 .76 .95 .72 .98 .86 .97 .83
89 .89 .86 .91 .90 .88 .97 .80 .87 .84 .92 .91 .97 .82 .96 .78 .96 .75 .98 .85 .96 .77 .95 .72 .98 .86 .97 .84
90 .89 .86 .92 .90 .88 .97 .81 .87 .85 .92 .91 .97 .82 .96 .79 .96 .75 .98 .85 .96 .77 .95 .73 .98 .87 .97 .84
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Table 12. Tabular Model: 91-120 NM
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91 .89 .86 .92 .90 .88 .97 .81 .87 .85 .92 .91 .97 .83 .96 .79 .96 .75 .98 .86 .96 .78 .95 .73 .98 .87 .97 .84
92 .89 .86 .92 .90 .88 .97 .81 .87 .85 .93 .91 .97 .83 .96 .80 .96 .76 .98 .86 .96 .78 .95 .74 .98 .87 .97 .84
93 .90 .87 .92 .90 .89 .97 .82 .88 .85 .93 .91 .97 .83 .97 .80 .96 .76 .98 .86 .96 .78 .95 .74 .98 .87 .97 .85
94 .90 .87 .92 .91 .89 .97 .82 .88 .86 .93 .91 .97 .84 .97 .80 .96 .77 .98 .86 .96 .79 .96 .75 .98 .88 .98 .85
95 .90 .87 .92 .91 .89 .97 .82 .88 .86 .93 .92 .97 .84 .97 .81 .96 .77 .98 .87 .96 .79 .96 .75 .98 .88 .98 .85
96 .90 .87 .92 .91 .89 .97 .83 .88 .86 .93 .92 .97 .84 .97 .81 .96 .77 .98 .87 .97 .79 .96 .75 .98 .88 .98 .86
97 .90 .87 .92 .91 .89 .97 .83 .88 .86 .93 .92 .97 .84 .97 .81 .96 .78 .98 .87 .97 .80 .96 .76 .98 .88 .98 .86
98 .90 .88 .93 .91 .90 .97 .83 .89 .86 .93 .92 .97 .85 .97 .82 .96 .78 .98 .87 .97 .80 .96 .76 .98 .88 .98 .86
99 .90 .88 .93 .91 .90 .97 .84 .89 .87 .93 .92 .97 .85 .97 .82 .96 .79 .98 .88 .97 .81 .96 .77 .98 .89 .98 .86
100 .91 .88 .93 .91 .90 .97 .84 .89 .87 .93 .92 .98 .85 .97 .82 .96 .79 .98 .88 .97 .81 .96 .77 .98 .89 .98 .87
101 .91 .88 .93 .92 .90 .97 .84 .89 .87 .94 .92 .98 .86 .97 .83 .96 .79 .98 .88 .97 .81 .96 .78 .98 .89 .98 .87
102 .91 .88 .93 .92 .90 .97 .84 .89 .87 .94 .92 .98 .86 .97 .83 .97 .80 .98 .88 .97 .82 .96 .78 .98 .89 .98 .87
103 .91 .88 .93 .92 .90 .97 .85 .89 .88 .94 .93 .98 .86 .97 .83 .97 .80 .98 .88 .97 .82 .96 .78 .98 .90 .98 .87
104 .91 .89 .93 .92 .91 .97 .85 .90 .88 .94 .93 .98 .86 .97 .84 .97 .80 .98 .89 .97 .82 .96 .79 .98 .90 .98 .88
105 .91 .89 .93 .92 .91 .98 .85 .90 .88 .94 .93 .98 .87 .97 .84 .97 .81 .98 .89 .97 .83 .96 .79 .98 .90 .98 .88
106 .92 .89 .94 .92 .91 .98 .86 .90 .88 .94 .93 .98 .87 .97 .84 .97 .81 .98 .89 .97 .83 .97 .79 .98 .90 .98 .88
107 .92 .89 .94 .92 .91 .98 .86 .90 .88 .94 .93 .98 .87 .97 .85 .97 .81 .98 .89 .97 .83 .97 .80 .98 .90 .98 .88
108 .92 .89 .94 .93 .91 .98 .86 .90 .88 .94 .93 .98 .87 .97 .85 .97 .82 .98 .89 .97 .83 .97 .80 .98 .90 .98 .89
109 .92 .90 .94 .93 .91 .98 .86 .90 .89 .94 .93 .98 .88 .98 .85 .97 .82 .98 .90 .97 .84 .97 .81 .99 .91 .98 .89
110 .92 .90 .94 .93 .91 .98 .87 .91 .89 .94 .93 .98 .88 .98 .85 .97 .82 .98 .90 .97 .84 .97 .81 .99 .91 .98 .89
111 .92 .90 .94 .93 .92 .98 .87 .91 .89 .95 .93 .98 .88 .98 .86 .97 .83 .98 .90 .97 .84 .97 .81 .99 .91 .98 .89
112 .92 .90 .94 .93 .92 .98 .87 .91 .89 .95 .94 .98 .88 .98 .86 .97 .83 .98 .90 .97 .85 .97 .82 .99 .91 .98 .89
113 .92 .90 .94 .93 .92 .98 .87 .91 .89 .95 .94 .98 .89 .98 .86 .97 .83 .98 .90 .98 .85 .97 .82 .99 .91 .98 .90
114 .93 .90 .94 .93 .92 .98 .88 .91 .90 .95 .94 .98 .89 .98 .87 .97 .84 .98 .91 .98 .85 .97 .82 .99 .92 .98 .90
115 .93 .90 .94 .93 .92 .98 .88 .91 .90 .95 .94 .98 .89 .98 .87 .97 .84 .99 .91 .98 .85 .97 .83 .99 .92 .98 .90
116 .93 .91 .94 .93 .92 .98 .88 .91 .90 .95 .94 .98 .89 .98 .87 .97 .84 .99 .91 .98 .86 .97 .83 .99 .92 .98 .90
117 .93 .91 .95 .94 .92 .98 .88 .92 .90 .95 .94 .98 .89 .98 .87 .97 .85 .99 .91 .98 .86 .97 .83 .99 .92 .98 .90
118 .93 .91 .95 .94 .92 .98 .89 .92 .90 .95 .94 .98 .90 .98 .88 .98 .85 .99 .91 .98 .86 .97 .83 .99 .92 .98 .91
119 .93 .91 .95 .94 .93 .98 .89 .92 .90 .95 .94 .98 .90 .98 .88 .98 .85 .99 .91 .98 .87 .97 .84 .99 .92 .99 .91
120 .93 .91 .95 .94 .93 .98 .89 .92 .90 .95 .94 .98 .90 .98 .88 .98 .85 .99 .92 .98 .87 .97 .84 .99 .92 .99 .91
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Table 13. Tabular Model: 121-150 NM
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121 .93 .91 .95 .94 .93 .98 .89 .92 .91 .95 .94 .98 .90 .98 .88 .98 .86 .99 .92 .98 .87 .97 .84 .99 .93 .99 .91
122 .94 .92 .95 .94 .93 .98 .89 .92 .91 .95 .95 .98 .90 .98 .88 .98 .86 .99 .92 .98 .87 .97 .85 .99 .93 .99 .91
123 .94 .92 .95 .94 .93 .98 .90 .92 .91 .96 .95 .98 .91 .98 .89 .98 .86 .99 .92 .98 .87 .98 .85 .99 .93 .99 .91
124 .94 .92 .95 .94 .93 .98 .90 .92 .91 .96 .95 .99 .91 .98 .89 .98 .86 .99 .92 .98 .88 .98 .85 .99 .93 .99 .92
125 .94 .92 .95 .94 .93 .98 .90 .93 .91 .96 .95 .99 .91 .98 .89 .98 .87 .99 .92 .98 .88 .98 .86 .99 .93 .99 .92
126 .94 .92 .95 .94 .93 .98 .90 .93 .91 .96 .95 .99 .91 .98 .89 .98 .87 .99 .93 .98 .88 .98 .86 .99 .93 .99 .92
127 .94 .92 .95 .95 .94 .98 .90 .93 .91 .96 .95 .99 .91 .98 .90 .98 .87 .99 .93 .98 .88 .98 .86 .99 .93 .99 .92
128 .94 .92 .95 .95 .94 .98 .91 .93 .92 .96 .95 .99 .91 .98 .90 .98 .87 .99 .93 .98 .89 .98 .86 .99 .94 .99 .92
129 .94 .92 .96 .95 .94 .99 .91 .93 .92 .96 .95 .99 .92 .98 .90 .98 .88 .99 .93 .98 .89 .98 .87 .99 .94 .99 .92
130 .94 .93 .96 .95 .94 .99 .91 .93 .92 .96 .95 .99 .92 .98 .90 .98 .88 .99 .93 .98 .89 .98 .87 .99 .94 .99 .92
131 .94 .93 .96 .95 .94 .99 .91 .93 .92 .96 .95 .99 .92 .98 .90 .98 .88 .99 .93 .98 .89 .98 .87 .99 .94 .99 .93
132 .95 .93 .96 .95 .94 .99 .91 .93 .92 .96 .95 .99 .92 .98 .91 .98 .88 .99 .93 .98 .89 .98 .87 .99 .94 .99 .93
133 .95 .93 .96 .95 .94 .99 .91 .94 .92 .96 .95 .99 .92 .98 .91 .98 .89 .99 .94 .98 .90 .98 .88 .99 .94 .99 .93
134 .95 .93 .96 .95 .94 .99 .92 .94 .92 .96 .96 .99 .92 .99 .91 .98 .89 .99 .94 .98 .90 .98 .88 .99 .94 .99 .93
135 .95 .93 .96 .95 .94 .99 .92 .94 .93 .96 .96 .99 .93 .99 .91 .98 .89 .99 .94 .98 .90 .98 .88 .99 .94 .99 .93
136 .95 .93 .96 .95 .94 .99 .92 .94 .93 .96 .96 .99 .93 .99 .91 .98 .89 .99 .94 .98 .90 .98 .88 .99 .94 .99 .93
137 .95 .93 .96 .95 .95 .99 .92 .94 .93 .96 .96 .99 .93 .99 .91 .98 .89 .99 .94 .98 .90 .98 .88 .99 .95 .99 .93
138 .95 .93 .96 .96 .95 .99 .92 .94 .93 .97 .96 .99 .93 .99 .92 .98 .90 .99 .94 .98 .91 .98 .89 .99 .95 .99 .94
139 .95 .94 .96 .96 .95 .99 .92 .94 .93 .97 .96 .99 .93 .99 .92 .98 .90 .99 .94 .99 .91 .98 .89 .99 .95 .99 .94
140 .95 .94 .96 .96 .95 .99 .93 .94 .93 .97 .96 .99 .93 .99 .92 .98 .90 .99 .94 .99 .91 .98 .89 .99 .95 .99 .94
141 .95 .94 .96 .96 .95 .99 .93 .94 .93 .97 .96 .99 .93 .99 .92 .98 .90 .99 .94 .99 .91 .98 .89 .99 .95 .99 .94
142 .95 .94 .96 .96 .95 .99 .93 .94 .93 .97 .96 .99 .94 .99 .92 .98 .90 .99 .95 .99 .91 .98 .89 .99 .95 .99 .94
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144 .96 .94 .97 .96 .95 .99 .93 .95 .94 .97 .96 .99 .94 .99 .93 .99 .91 .99 .95 .99 .92 .98 .90 .99 .95 .99 .94
145 .96 .94 .97 .96 .95 .99 .93 .95 .94 .97 .96 .99 .94 .99 .93 .99 .91 .99 .95 .99 .92 .98 .90 .99 .95 .99 .94
146 .96 .94 .97 .96 .95 .99 .93 .95 .94 .97 .96 .99 .94 .99 .93 .99 .91 .99 .95 .99 .92 .98 .90 .99 .95 .99 .95
147 .96 .94 .97 .96 .95 .99 .94 .95 .94 .97 .96 .99 .94 .99 .93 .99 .91 .99 .95 .99 .92 .98 .90 .99 .96 .99 .95
148 .96 .94 .97 .96 .95 .99 .94 .95 .94 .97 .96 .99 .94 .99 .93 .99 .91 .99 .95 .99 .92 .99 .91 .99 .96 .99 .95
149 .96 .95 .97 .96 .96 .99 .94 .95 .94 .97 .97 .99 .94 .99 .93 .99 .92 .99 .95 .99 .92 .99 .91 .99 .96 .99 .95
150 .96 .95 .97 .96 .96 .99 .94 .95 .94 .97 .97 .99 .95 .99 .93 .99 .92 .99 .95 .99 .93 .99 .91 .99 .96 .99 .95
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